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1 Introduction 
The first section of this document contains a description of the project context. The document thereby 
is positioned within the framework of activities for the ‘European Airport Movement Management by 
A-SMGCS’ (EMMA) project [1]. 
1.1 EMMA Project Background 
The ‘European Airport Movement Management by A-SMGCS’ (EMMA) integrated project is set 
within the Sixth Framework Program of the European Commission (Directorate General for Energy 
and Transport) and looks at A-SMGCS as a holistic approach for changes in airport operations. It 
builds on the experiences of earlier projects such as ‘Operational Benefit Evaluation by Testing A-
SMGCS’ (BETA) [4]. With BETA new technologies for data extraction, digitising, data fusion, data 
link and multilateration became available. Although A-SMGCS progressed from a demonstration 
status to a fully operational system, the complete proof of benefit of A-SMGCS was missing. 
Therefore, EMMA is supposed to set the standards for A-SMGCS systems and their operational usage, 
safety and interoperability while also focussing on the benefit expectation in Europe. 
In EMMA an implementation of A-SMGCS Levels I and II will be looked at as an initial step. While 
the Level I implementation merely seeks to enhance safety and efficiency on the ground by means of 
additional surveillance services, the Level II implementation already looks at an automated control 
service which helps controllers to detect potentially dangerous conflicts on runways and restricted 
areas. In EMMA2 project the focus will be extended to more automated services of A-SMGCS [8]. 
The new services allow for the sharing of traffic situational awareness among pilots and drivers on the 
airport and the introduction of an automated routing function. The system will be enhanced with 
additional functions such as conflict resolution advisories for controllers and the up-link of a validated 
route planning to pilots and drivers. 
1.2 EMMA SP6 Background 
Validation in the EMMA framework refers to all activities during the development of A-SMCGS 
concepts, systems, and procedures aiming at implementing the right concept, procedure, or system. 
The concept development itself is carried out in EMMA SP1 and thus is not a part of the work in this 
SP. Developing and implementing the right concepts, procedures and systems (in terms of safety, 
efficiency, usability etc.) is of utmost importance at a time where advances in ATM are urgently 
required.  
Before successful validation takes place, verification, i.e. testing against system specifications should 
take place. This Sub-project (SP6) also covers the description of the verification phase. Only if 
verification results in an A-SMGCS performing at the required level, successful validation of the 
concept can be started. Therefore, the verification and validation effort (called V&V) also includes the 
definition of minimum required performance criteria for verification, to allow for successful 
validation.  
In summary (see also Ref. [6]):  
Verification is testing against predefined technical specifications, technical functional testing (‘did we 
build the system right?’). 
Validation is testing against operational requirements (as defined by stakeholders and written down 
in the ORD document of EMMA SP1 [10]), man-in-the-loop, ATM procedure testing, case studies 
(‘did we build the right system?’). 
 
During the proposal phase of EMMA Phase 1, it was decided to use the ‘Master European Validation 
Plan (MAEVA)’ project approach to validation as the basis for EMMA Validation and Verification 
(V&V). The MAEVA approach is well accepted throughout the European ATM community and has 
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been described in abundant detail in the MAEVA Validation Guideline Handbook, or VGH for short 
(see Ref. [5]). Nevertheless, several adaptations of MAEVA were proposed in Europe concentrating 
on the initial approach to validation activities and the related life cycle of the concept or technology to 
be validated. The “Co-operative Approach to Air Traffic Services” (CAATS) project teams 
summarised this proposal in their “European Operational Concept Validation Methodology” 
document, E-OCVM for short (see Ref. [15]), which is European wide accepted now.  
EMMA liaised closely with both the MAEVA and the CAATS project teams. The European 
Commission installed the CAATS project with the objective to co-ordinate safety, Human Factors and 
validation processes, and methodologies across ATM projects in the Sixth Framework. CAATS 
identified best practices from these areas and brought the implied knowledge to all projects of the 
framework. The aim is to provide a co-ordinated approach to bring about the paradigm shift described 
in the ATM2000+ strategy (Ref. [3]). 
 
1.3 EMMA WP6.3 Context 
The work package 6.3 is called “Prague V&V” and includes all test activities linked to simulation and 
on-site trials related to the Prague controllers and Prague Ruzyne Airport itself. These include: 
• Preparation of the Prague V&V infrastructure  
• Technical tests (Verification) of A-SMGCS installed in Prague  
o Assess long term surveillance performance data to promote the certification process  
o Assess the alert performance data  
• Promote the certification process 
• Real Time simulation set-up and integration of the Prague A-SMGCS 
o Controller Training for Prague  
o On-site Benefit Assessment of level I&II use 
• Operational Field Trials at Prague airport 
o Controller Training for Prague using the test bed implementation 
o Validate procedures using surveillance information 
o Validate system alert algorithm and procedures 
 
1.4 Scope of the Verification and Validation Exercises 
The basic aim of the EMMA Project is the V&V of A-SMGCS Level II functionality as described in 
the ICAO Manual and further refined in the ORD. EMMA Level II technical and operational 
functionality is identical to the definition outlined in the official documents of the EUROCONTROL 
A-SMGCS project. EMMA WP6.3 aims to validate the A-SMGCS Level II concept at Prague-Ruzynĕ 
airport. 
Four stages of V&V activities have been considered. These are illustrated in the figure below. 
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Operational Improvements
Operational Feasibility
Technical 
Tests
Operational Benefits
Verification
Validation
 
Table 1-1  Stages of V&V Activities 
 
The Technical Tests Stage refers to the tests that should be conducted in order to assess the technical 
performance of A-SMGCS equipment. It answers the question: “What are the performances of the 
equipment?” 
The Operational Feasibility Stage refers to the definition of the operational use of equipment and 
procedures, in accordance with the performances assessed in the previous stage. It answers the 
question: “Given the performances of the equipment, is it usable and acceptable?” 
The Operational Improvements Stage refers to the evaluation of the operational improvements, in 
terms of Safety, Capacity, Efficiency, and Human Factors, using the equipment and the procedures 
defined in the previous stage. It answers the question: “Given the accepted A-SMGCS equipment and 
procedures, how is ATM improved?” 
The Operational Benefits Stage refers to the translation of the operational improvements assessed 
during the previous stage into terms of economical benefits. It answers the question: “What are the 
economic benefits for the purchasers and users of A-SMGCS products?” 
To summarise, the V&V aims for Prague-Ruzynĕ airport are as follows: 
Verification Aims: To demonstrate that the A-SMGCS (Surveillance and Control functions), 
provided to the controllers, are implemented in accordance with the technical specifications listed in 
D3.1.1, Ground System Requirements for Prague-Ruzynĕ Airport [11] and the D1.4.2a, Technical 
Requirements Document Part a – Ground [17]. The D142a Technical Requirements have been 
deduced from the operational requirements listed in D135 ORD [10]. 
 
Validation Aims: 
The overall aim is to assess the operational feasibility and operational improvements of the Prague-
Ruzynĕ A-SMGCS in achieving its intended operational goals as defined in the D131 OSED 
document [16] and the D135 ORD document [10]. 
In general, it can be expected that the validation exercises will demonstrate the Operational Feasibility 
of the ATM operational concept and that the concept provides a solution to the specific ATM problem 
and leads to Operational Improvements when comparing it to current SMGCS, both for airports and 
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for the airborne side, and for different airport operating conditions. 
RT-Simulations will focus on the operational feasibility of the monitoring and alert function. The RT-
Simulation platform serves as a perfect V&V platform to evoke safety critical events and to tune the 
system alerts to the needs of the ATCOs. In addition to this main goal operational improvements in 
terms of safety and efficiency gains shall be proved. Also for this purpose the RTS is a well-suited 
means. 
On-site, V&V activities will concentrate on the measurement of the technical performance and 
showing the operational feasibility of the whole system. Measuring “operational improvements” in the 
field are very difficult or even impossible. Frequently, users and the system are not certified for it to be 
used fully operationally. Furthermore, a valid baseline with ceteris paribus condition compared to the 
experimental condition (with A-SMGCS) does not exist at all. Weather, traffic mix, traffic amount, 
runway in use, ATCOs, etc., change frequently and any improvement effects of the A-SMGCS are 
then overshadowed. However, in the field it has to be shown that the overall system meets the 
technical performance and operational requirements. When this can be proven, operational 
improvements, which are measured in the RTS, can be transferred to the real environment.  
1.5 Scope of Document  
The document is divided into six chapters: 
Chapter 1  is this introduction. It describes the background, purpose and scope of the document, 
the document structure and context, and the methodology used. 
Chapter 2  provides the verification results in terms of short and long term Technical Tests 
Chapter 3  provides all raw data and results of the two Real Time Simulation trials 
Chapter 4  provides all raw data and results of the Operational Field Trials 
Chapter 5  provides conclusions drawn from the test results 
Chapter 6  is an Annex with the flight test scenario description, lists of references, abbreviations, 
tables and figures. 
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2 Technical Tests Results 
This chapter describes the technical tests performed and the results obtained. 
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 EMMA Test-Bed at Prague Ruzyne Tower 
The following figure shows the architecture of the EMMA test-bed system used for the technical tests 
at Prague. 
LAN Switch/RouterRANC
SDS RPS
AUX
CWP-1
CWP-1
CWP-2
CWP-2
CWP-3
CWP-3
CWP-4
CWP-4SDS/RPS
KVM Switch
TECAMS
TECAMS
CDD GEC TEC TPC
MLAT
RCMS
VSDFLocal Area Network
of
ANS CR
IP-RS &
Companel
SMR
MLAT/ADS-B
ASR - E2000
MVP (Gap-Filler)
AGL - AMS.2
FDPS/ESUP
TIME - NTP
Companels
& RS-IP
Sensors and
Information Sources
 
Figure 2-1: EMMA Test-Bed Set-up at Prague 
 
The EMMA test-bed system at Prague-Ruzynĕ airport consists of a combination of hardware and 
software components provided specifically for the EMMA project together with the pre-existing 
infrastructure. This infrastructure includes the surveillance sensors (SMR, MLAT, and ASR-E2000), 
the Flight Data Processing System (FDPS-ESUP), the Aerodrome Ground Lighting (AGL) system, 
and the local area network (LAN).  
 
Components provided specifically for the EMMA test-bed comprise the following items: 
• Surveillance Data Server (SDS) 
• Technical Control and Monitoring System (TECAMS) 
• Recording and Playback System (RPS) with Auxiliary Mass Storage Unit (AUX) 
• Keyboard/Video/Mouse (KVM) switch 
 
EMMA 
Test Results PRAGUE DLR 
 
Save date: 2006-06-02 Public Page 11 
File Name: D631_Results-PRG_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
• Controller Working Positions (CWP) denoted CDD, GEC, TEC and TPC 
• SMR Extractor (RANC)  
• Gap-Filler System, including Machine Vision Processor (MVP) sensors, communication panels 
(Companels) and RS-485 to Internet converters, and Video Sensor Data Fusion (VSDF) 
• MLAT/ADS-B Processing System, including Remote Control and Monitoring System (RCMS) 
In addition, forty vehicles belonging to ANS CR and Prague Airport Company were equipped with 
Mode S squitter beacons (SQB). 
Document D3.1.1 Ground System Requirements - Prague [11] describes the EMMA test-bed system 
and lists the technical requirements. 
2.1.2 Indicators and Measurement Instruments 
The definition of indicators that were to be measured can be found in the document D6.1.2 Test Plan - 
Prague [13]. Only the key words and abbreviations are repeated here.  
The most important technical performance requirements were to be assessed by 18 verification 
indicators. Their relation to the TRD, ORD, ICAO, and EUROCAE (MASPS) technical requirements 
can be seen in the table below.  
The verification tests aim primarily at assessing the long-term quality of the surveillance and conflict 
detection performance. These long-term measurements were to be performed by the recording and 
analysis tool MOGADOR, which is described in Document D1.1.2 CDG A-SMGCS Data Analysis 
[14]. Other measurement instruments were Matrices of Detection and Identification, described in the 
data analysis section below. In addition, short-term tests were to be performed prior to the long-term 
technical and operational test period in order to assess the readiness of the test-bed system and to 
verify by visual observation the system’s compliance with the technical requirements in D3.1.1 [11].  
 
The following table summarises the indicators and measurement instruments associated with the 
verification of the technical performance requirements. 
 
ID Indicator Acronym Requirement Reference Measurement 
Instruments 
VE-1 Coverage 
Volume 
CV Approaches 
Manoeuvring Area 
Apron taxi lines 
TRD: Tech_Surv_01; 02 
ORD: Op_Serv-07 
ICAO: 4.1.1.4 
MASPS: 3.1.3  
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
VE-2 Probability of 
Detection 
PD ≥ 99.9% TRD: Tech_Surv_35 
ORD: Op_Perf-01 
ICAO: 3.4.1.4.a 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
Matrix of Detection 
VE-3 Probability of 
False Detection 
PFD < 10E-3 per 
Reported Target 
TRD: Tech_Surv_36 
ORD: Op_Perf-02 
ICAO: 3.4.1.4.b 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
Matrix of Detection 
VE-4 Reference Point RP Not defined TRD: Tech_Gen_45 
ORD: None 
ICAO: 3.5.7; 4.2.2 
MASPS: 3.2.1.2  
Recording 
Observations 
 
VE-5 Reported 
Position 
Accuracy 
RPA ≤ 7.5 m  
at a confidence 
level of 95% 
TRD: Tech_Surv_26 
ORD: Op_Perf-05; 15 
ICAO: 4.2.3 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
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ID Indicator Acronym Requirement Reference Measurement 
Instruments 
VE-6 Reported 
Position 
Resolution 
RPR ≤ 1 m  TRD: Tech_Surv_27 
ORD: Op_Perf-06 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-7 Reported 
Position 
Discrimination 
RPD Not defined TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None 
Recording 
Observations 
VE-8 Reported 
Velocity 
Accuracy 
RVA Speed:  ≤ 5 m/s 
Direction: ≤ 10° 
at a confidence 
level of 95% 
TRD: Tech_Surv_28; 29 
ORD: Op_Perf-16 
ICAO: 4.1.1.8, 4.1.1.10 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-9 Probability of 
Identification 
PID ≥ 99.9% for 
identifiable Targets 
TRD: Tech_Surv_37 
ORD: Op_Perf-03 
ICAO: 3.4.1.4.c 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
 
VE-10 Probability of 
False 
Identification 
PFID < 10E-3 per 
Reported Target 
TRD: Tech_Surv_38 
ORD: Op_Perf-04 
ICAO: 3.4.1.4.d 
MASPS: 3.2.3 
Recording 
Observations 
MOGADOR 
 
VE-11 Target Report 
Update Rate 
TRUR ≤ 1 s  
 
TRD: Tech_Surv_34 
ORD: Op_Perf-08 
ICAO: 4.2.4 
MASPS: 3.2.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-12 Probability of 
Detection of an 
Alert Situation 
PDAS ≥ 99.9% TRD: Tech_Cont_11 
ORD: None 
ICAO: 4.5.1 
MASPS: 3.3.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-13 Probability of 
False Alert 
PFA < 10E-3 per Alert TRD: Tech_ Cont_12 
ORD: Op_Perf-20 
ICAO: 4.5.1 
MASPS: 3.3.3  
Recording 
Observations 
VE-14 Alert Response 
Time 
ART ≤ 0.5 s  
 
TRD: Tech_ Cont_13 
ORD: None 
ICAO: 4.5.2 
MASPS: 3.3.3  
Observations 
VE-15 Routing Process 
Time 
RPT < 10 s TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: 4.3.2 
Not applicable for 
Prague 
VE-16 Probability of 
Continuous 
Track 
PCT Not specified TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None  
Recording 
MOGADOR 
VE-17 Matrix of 
Detection 
MOD Not specified TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None  
Recording 
MOGADOR 
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ID Indicator Acronym Requirement Reference Measurement 
Instruments 
VE-18 Matrix of 
Identification 
MOI Not specified TRD: None 
ORD: None 
ICAO: None 
MASPS: None  
Recording 
MOGADOR 
Table 2-1: Technical Verification Indicators 
 
2.2 Raw Data 
Raw data was gathered during Site Acceptance Testing (SAT) of the EMMA test-bed system carried 
out at Prague Ruzynĕ airport in the period 14-18 March 2005.  
Site acceptance testing concentrated mainly on the specific items provided for the EMMA Test-Bed. 
However, to prepare the way for the operational verification and validation exercises in SP6, the SAT 
also included basic technical performance verification tests of the overall A-SMGCS including the 
existing surveillance sensors. These technical verification tests and the results obtained are described 
in this section. 
The objectives of the SAT were to verify the correct function of the EMMA test-bed system and to 
demonstrate that the technical requirements defined in deliverable document D3.1.1 Ground System 
Requirements - Prague [11] had been fulfilled.  
The SAT was performed by Park Air Systems personnel with the assistance of ANS CR and witnessed 
by ANS CR. 
Supplementary tests were performed in the period 8-11 November 2005. 
Testing consisted mainly of visual observation of the traffic situation displays at the controller 
working positions in the EMMA test room (old TWR) while observing the live traffic through the 
window. In addition, a follow-me vehicle equipped with a 1090ES squitter beacon (SQB) was directed 
to perform various manoeuvres in order to gather data for the measurement of specific verification 
indicators. 
All relevant data was continuously recorded throughout the trial period for later analysis. 
The data collected consisted of recordings in Park Air proprietary format and included: 
- Target reports from all surveillance sensor systems 
- Flight plan data 
- Target reports from the surveillance data fusion process of the SDS 
- Operator actions at the CWPs 
- Alerts 
- Airport context data  
During a replay session, this recorded information is sufficient to permit the full reconstruction of all 
information displayed at any CWP.  
The archive media is Advanced Intelligent Tape ™ (™ Sony AIT).  
2.3 Results 
Except for the performance indicator results derived in this section, the full list of technical 
requirements for the Prague test-bed, with the related acceptance tests and the results obtained, is 
given in document D3.6.1 Site Acceptance Test Report - Prague [12]. The main objective of the site 
acceptance tests was to ensure that the performance of the EMMA test-bed system was adequate to 
permit the system to be used for operational tests. 
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Some requirements were verified by visual observation, others by analysing recorded data to obtain 
quantitative results. These tests and the results obtained are described below. 
The MOGADOR tool was used to perform automatic long-term observations of the system 
surveillance performance. Data were compiled and analysed over a period of 4 weeks. The tool can 
locate blind spots and output maps with blind spots for the different conditions. 
The data are analysed by taking into account different independent variables: 
• Different traffic objects that operate on the airport (aircraft, vehicles, unknown) 
• Different weather conditions (no snow and precipitation vs. snow or and precipitation) 
• Different zones of the aerodrome (Runway, Obstacles Free Zone [OFZ], Taxiways) 
In the test descriptions that follow, each indicator is presented under a separate heading in the 
following format: 
- Indicator ID -  a unique, unambiguous identifier for each indicator. 
- Hypothesis   - the specification of the requirement or definition of the indicator to be 
tested  
- Test Procedure  -  the description of the test method, or a statement of how the requirement 
has been fulfilled without the need for a specific test. In some cases, the 
test procedure is split into short-term and long-term tests. 
- Result - the result of the test, including analysis of the test data where applicable 
 
2.3.1 Coverage Volume (VE-1) 
Hypothesis 
VE-1 
The A-SMGCS equipment should provide surveillance coverage throughout the Movement 
Area up to a height of at least 200 feet above the Aerodrome surface, and on the approaches to 
each runway out to a distance of 10 NM. 
 
Test Procedure 
a) Short-Term Test (performed at SAT) 
The Coverage Volume (CV) was tested by visual observation transiting the Movement Area of interest 
with a test vehicle and recording the target report position and identification data. Coverage was also 
confirmed by observing the HMI. 
All aircraft and vehicle movements, non-cooperative as well as cooperative, were recorded over a 
period of one hour with heavy traffic. The recordings included airborne aircraft on the approaches to 
the airport. 
Weather conditions at the time of the test were noted.  
 
Result 
a) Short-Term Test 
The following figure shows the Prague Ruzynĕ airport layout at the date of the 
test.
 
EMMA 
Test Results PRAGUE DLR 
 
Save date: 2006-06-02 Public Page 15 
File Name: D631_Results-PRG_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
 
Figure 2-2: Prague Ruzynĕ Airport Layout 
 
Aerodrome Status: Taxiways C and D and northern end of RWY 31 were closed throughout the test 
period due to construction of new rapid exits. Pier C was under construction. 
The following figure shows the trajectories of all traffic within 10NM of the airport during the hour of 
recording. The trajectories are the position reports recorded at the output of the surveillance data 
server (SDS).  
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
During the period of the recording, runways 06 and 31 were in use, both in mixed mode. 
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Figure 2-3: Plot Showing Coverage out to 10NM during CV Test 
 
Note that the target report update rate for airborne traffic is higher close to the airport where the traffic 
is within range of the MLAT system. Farther out, the only sensor contributing to the track is the 
approach radar (with a 6 second update rate).   
 
The following figure shows the trajectories of all ground traffic on the movement area of the airport 
during the hour of recording. The trajectories are the position reports recorded at the output of the 
surveillance data server (SDS). 
Sensors contributing are MLAT, SMR, and GFS. 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
During the period of the recording, runways 06 and 31 were in use, both in mixed mode. 
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Figure 2-4: Plot Showing Ground Traffic Trajectories during CV Test 
 
The following figure shows the single trajectory of the test vehicle “FOLLOW 3” that was used to 
check the coverage. 
The trajectory is generated using the trajectory function on the RPS Playback.  
Sensors contributing are MLAT, SMR, and GFS. 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
File: “Follow3.txt” recorded 15 March 2005, starting at 13:30 UTC. 
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Figure 2-5: Playback Image Showing Trajectory of Test Vehicle during CV Test 
The test vehicle started from Pier B, proceeded via TWY A to Hold at stop bar for RWY 24; Drove 
the whole length of RWY 24, exited on TWY F and proceeded along F to L crossing RWY 1331; 
Drove South on L, then via P to South Apron. After stop on apron, the vehicle proceeded via R and L 
to hold at stop bar for RWY 31. Drove RWY 31 as far as TWY F; proceeded along F to hold at stop 
bar for RWY 06. Returned via F to North Apron. 
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
No long-term analysis of CV was performed for VE-01. As coverage volume the whole Movement 
Area is taken into consideration. 
 
2.3.2 Probability of Detection (VE-2) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-2 
The probability that an actual aircraft, vehicle, or object is detected and reported at the output of 
the SDS should be 99.9% at minimum. 
 
Test Procedure 
a) Short-Term Test (performed at SAT) 
The test scenario was the same as the CV test (see VE-1 above).  
The recorded data for the test vehicle and for a selection of identified aircraft was used to calculate the 
Probability of Detection (PD) as follows: 
Reports that were found to be inaccurate (> 20m from expected position for ground, > 200m 
for airborne) or not timely (> 1.5 seconds old) were discarded. The remaining reports were 
considered as correct reports.  
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The expected number of reports is: Time of the last report - Time of the first report + 1 
                                      TRUR  
 
Then, %100.
reportsofnumberExpected
reportscorrectofNumberPD =  
 
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
The test scenario was the same as for the CV test (see VE-1 above).  
First, the MOGADOR tool was used to calculate the PD for the same data as for the short-term tests. 
This MOGADOR result was compared with the calculated value to confirm that the MOGADOR was 
correctly calibrated.  
MOGADOR was then used to assess the PD for the longer period (4 weeks). 
 
 
Results 
a) Short-Term Test 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
File: “Follow3.txt” recorded 15 March 2005, starting at 13:30 UTC. 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
 
Area Mobile Type Expected No. 
of Reports 
No. of Correct 
Reports 
PD 
Aircraft 1472 1471 99.93% RWY 
Test vehicle 251 251 100% 
Aircraft 2830 2820 99.65% TWY 
Test vehicle 1730 1730 100% 
Approach Aircraft 1167 1165 99.83% 
Table 2-2: Results of Probability of Detection Test 
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
For the evaluation three days with good weather-conditions (no snow, no precipitation) and seven days 
with non-optimal conditions (snow, sunshine, and precipitation) are taken into consideration. The 
following figures show the results for the PD for the different types of mobiles (All, Aircraft, Vehicle, 
and Unknown) and the three locations Runways, Obstacle Free Zone (OFZ) and Taxiways. The results 
are grouped by the named weather conditions. 
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Figure 2-6: PD Long Term Observation (excellent weather conditions (no snow, no precipitation)) 
While the PD for Aircraft and Vehicle on Runways and Taxiways in good weather stays on a high 
level (AC 99.2-99.8%, Vehicle 97.5-99.7%), the PD for Unknown mobiles varies from 83.7-98.3%. 
The values for the Taxiways are significantly lower.    
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Figure 2-7: PD Long Term Observation (no optimal weather conditions (snow) 
 
In non-optimal weather conditions, a reduction of the PD can be seen. For “All” the PD has a 
minimum of 92% (Runway and Taxiways) and a maximum of 98% (Runways and OFZ). 
During the analysis with MOGADOR, it has been discovered that reports of tracks are rejected by the 
tool. This happens if tracks are crossing the apron area (which has been masked out by MOGADOR) 
or running besides the RWY after take-off. The path reconstruction function is used to combine 
isolated reports and track-parts with other tracks. For Prague airport, reports have been added to tracks 
which do not belong to them. It has been identified that the tuning of the parameters of MOGADOR 
has a big influence on the results. It needs a lot of time to get this function working properly. 
Furthermore, a correct, highly accurate, and a current topology for the airport is necessary. All the 
mentioned facts lead to the result, that the PD is very different from day to day. 
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2.3.3 Probability of False Detection (VE-3) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-3 
The probability that anything other than an actual aircraft, vehicle, or object is detected and 
reported at the output of the SDS should not exceed 10E-3 per reported target. 
 
Test Procedure 
a) Short-Term Test (performed at SAT) 
The test scenario was the same as for the CV test (see VE-1 above).  
The recorded data was used to calculate the Probability of False Detection (PFD) as follows: 
The number of erroneous reports was found by summing reports not corresponding to known 
obstacles (considering the required accuracy) with the discarded reports from known mobiles 
that do not meet accuracy and timeliness requirements (see PD test for values).  
Then, %100⋅=
reportsofnumberTotal
reportserroneousofNumberPFD  
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
First, the MOGADOR tool was used to calculate the PFD for the same data as for the short-term tests. 
This MOGADOR result was compared with the calculated value to confirm that the MOGADOR was 
correctly calibrated. MOGADOR was then used to assess the PFD for the longer period (4 weeks). 
 
Result 
a) Short-Term Test 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
File: “Follow3.txt” recorded 15 March 2005, starting at 13:30 UTC. 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
 
Area Mobile Type Expected No. 
of Reports 
No. of 
Erroneous 
Reports 
PFD 
Aircraft 1472 1 0.07% RWY 
Test vehicle 251 0 0.00% 
Aircraft 2830 2 0.07% TWY 
Test vehicle 1730 0 0.00% 
Approach Aircraft 1167 2 0.17% 
Table 2-3: Results of Probability of False Detection Test 
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
For the evaluation, three days with good weather-conditions (no snow, no precipitation) and seven 
days with non-optimal conditions (snow, precipitation) are taken into consideration. The following 
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figures show the results for the PFD for the different types of mobiles (All, Aircraft, Vehicle, and 
Unknown) and the three locations Runways, Obstacle Free Zone (OFZ), and Taxiways. The results are 
grouped by the named weather conditions. 
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Figure 2-8: PFD Long Term Observation (excellent weather conditions (no snow, no precipitation)) 
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Figure 2-9: PFD Long Term Observation (no optimal weather conditions (snow)) 
The analysis of the PFD with MOGADOR has shown that the differences of the PFD-value are big 
during bad weather. This also indicates that the result do not depend only on the weather, but are 
probably caused by inadequate tuning of the MOGADOR tool to the Prague airport conditions. 
 
2.3.4 Reference Point (VE-4) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-4 
A reference point on aircraft and vehicles is required to enable the A-SMGCS to determine 
their positions. 
 
Test Procedure 
The recommended common reference point is the geometric centre of the aircraft or vehicle. The aim 
of this test was to measure the bias between the reported position of the target and the target reference 
point, especially for medium and large aircraft. 
The test scenario was the same as for CV (see VE-1 above).  
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The recorded data was played back and used to observe stationary aircraft on the Controller HMI and 
to estimate the reported position compared with the actual position of the centre of the aircraft as 
shown by the SMR video image. Measurements were made for aircraft on different parts of the airport, 
with different headings with respect to the SMR, 
 
Result 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
 
Mobile Type RP (m) 
Small Vehicle < 2 m 
Small Aircraft (Cessna) < 3 m 
Medium Aircraft (ATR) < 7 m 
Large Aircraft (B737) < 12 m 
Very Large Aircraft (B747) < 20 m 
Table 2-4: Results of RP Test 
 
In all cases, the value of RP represents the displacement of the position symbol of the mobile on the 
CWP traffic situation display with respect to the centre of its SMR image. The position symbol is 
displaced because the data fusion gives most weight to the MLAT position reports, locate the position 
of the aircraft’s Mode S transmitting antenna. In the case of an aircraft, the direction of the 
displacement is always towards the nose; for a vehicle, it may be in any direction, depending on where 
the antenna has been mounted. 
In the longer term, the data fusion algorithm could be improved to take account of this displacement if 
the system knows the aircraft type and the direction in which the aircraft is heading. 
 
The following picture shows a queue of medium and large aircraft holding at a runway entry point. 
The displacement of the target position symbol towards the front of the aircraft can be clearly seen. 
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Figure 2-10: Row of Holding Aircraft showing Location of Position Symbol relative to SMR Image  
 
2.3.5 Reported Position Accuracy (VE-5) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-5 
The reported position accuracy of the surveillance data transmitted from the SDS to clients 
should be 7.5m or better at a confidence level of 95%. 
 
Test Procedure 
a) Static 
The test vehicle FOLLOW3 was driven to stop bar positions in six different areas of the airport. At 
each stop bar, the vehicle was positioned with its centre at the junction of the taxiway centreline and 
the stop bar line, where it remained stationary for at least 30 seconds. Target report data was recorded 
for later analysis. 
Weather conditions at the time of the test were noted.  
 
From the recorded data, the 95% Reported Position Accuracy (RPA) was calculated according to 
EUROCAE guidelines as follows: 
For each position report the errors in the X position, ∆x, and in the Y position, ∆y, were 
calculated: 
∆x   = (Known X position  -  Reported X position) in metres 
∆y   = (Known Y position  -  Reported Y position) in metres 
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Known Position
∆x 
∆y
Reported Position 
 
Figure 2-11: X and Y Components of Position Error 
 
The resulting data was used to calculate the mean X and Y errors according to the following 
formulae, where i = 1,2,3,…n and n is the number of reports: 
Mean deviation in X, mx  = ∑ ∆xi/n 
Mean deviation in Y, my  = ∑ ∆yi/n  
 
Then, the RPA was calculated using the following formulae: 
Rx = C*√(∑ (∆xi - mx)2/n) + mx   
Ry = C*√(∑ (∆yi – my)2/n) + my   
RPA = √(Rx2  + Ry2) 
 
Where the coefficient C is set to 1.960 for the required 95% confidence level. 
 
b) Dynamic 
The test vehicle made a series of manoeuvres as it drove around the Movement Area. These are the 
following manoeuvres: 
• Straight-line acceleration and deceleration on the runway  
• Driving at constant speeds along a runway and straight stretches of taxiway 
• Turning corners 
• Deceleration from high speed to stop at a stopbar 
 
Observation of the target reports on the Controller HMI when compared with the actual position of the 
vehicle was used to estimate the deviation. 
 
Result 
a) Static 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
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Location Coordinates n mx Rx my Ry RPA 
Stopbar A 497.2, 865.4 83 -0.67 1.99 -1.43 1.12 2.29 
Stopbar F -2823.2, -615.5 52 -2.77 -1.60 0.70 2.73 3.16 
Stopbar L 1101.7, -1658.4 395 -0.42 0.35 -1.01 -0.30 0.46 
Table 2-5: Static RPA Test Results 
 
Worst-case static RPA: 3.16 m 
 
 
Figure 2-12: Replay Showing part of Test Vehicle Trajectory during Test 
 
The picture shows the trajectory of the test vehicle during part of the test. 
The test vehicle started from Pier B, proceeded via TWY A to Hold at stop bar for RWY 24; Drove 
the whole length of RWY 24, exited on TWY F and proceeded along F to L crossing RWY 1331; 
Drove South on L, then via P to South Apron. After stop on apron, the vehicle proceeded via R and L 
to hold at stop bar for RWY 31. Drove RWY 31 as far as TWY F; proceeded along F to hold at stop 
bar for RWY 06. Returned via F to North Apron. 
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Figure 2-13: Replay Showing Test Vehicle stopped for Static RPA Test 
 
 
Figure 2-14: Plot Showing Distribution of Reported Position of Stationary Target 
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b) Dynamic 
It was not possible from the recorded data to obtain an objective measurement of the dynamic RPA. 
As can be seen from the figure below, the target tracks exhibit an overshoot when the target makes a 
rapid change of direction or speed. The degree of overshoot is proportional to the change of velocity. 
In order to make a meaningful objective measurement it is necessary to define a standard benchmark 
test and a desired result. This has not been done in EMMA. 
 
 
Figure 2-15: Test Vehicle Track showing Overshoot when Cornering 
 
2.3.6 Reported Position Resolution (VE-6) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-6 
The resolution of the position data in a target report should be better than 1 m. 
 
Test Procedure 
The test scenario was the same as for the static RPA test (see VE-5 above). 
Playback of the recorded data was used to verify that the smallest change in reported position was less 
than the specified value. 
The target reports from the stationary test vehicle were observed with the CWP set to the lowest range 
scale, which is 50 m (corresponding to approximately 0.1 m per pixel on the screen). The smallest 
change in reported position was measured. 
 
Result 
The smallest observable change was 1 pixel, corresponding to 0.1m on the 50m-range scale. 
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2.3.7 Reported Position Discrimination (VE-7) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-7 
It should be possible to discriminate closely spaced targets, if they are separated by more than 
the specified performance value.  
NOTE:  1) Only relevant when one of the targets is non-cooperative.  
              2) The value has not been specified 
 
Test Procedure 
Position a non-cooperative vehicle or obstacle at a known position. Move another non-cooperative 
vehicle from a distance greater than 100m towards the stationary object. Record the distance at which 
the Surveillance provides only one Target Report. Move the vehicle away from stationary object and 
record the distance at which the Surveillance again provides two reports. Conduct the test at least five 
times. Repeat the test procedure with the following conditions: 
• Non-cooperative with cooperative mobile 
• Different areas of the aerodrome 
The Reported Position Discrimination (RPD) is the worst-case result from all areas per mobile 
combination. 
 
Result 
This test was not carried out at Prague, since the indicator was defined after the SAT. There was not 
sufficient data recorded during the SAT test period to infer a result. 
 
2.3.8 Reported Velocity Accuracy (VE-8) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-8 
The accuracy of the target speed data transmitted from the SDS to clients should be better than 
5m/s at a confidence level of 95%. 
The accuracy of the direction of movement data transmitted from the SDS to clients should be 
better than 10° at a confidence level of 95%. 
 
Test Procedure 
The test vehicle FOLLOW3 was driven at a constant speed along the runway and straight stretches of 
taxiway and the target reports were recorded for at least 50 updates. This test was done in three 
different areas of the airport and at three different speeds.  
Weather conditions at the time of the test were noted.  
 
During playback, the HMI was configured to show the velocity vector and a label with speed and 
heading for each update. 
From the recorded data, the 95% Reported Velocity Accuracy (RVA) was calculated according to 
EUROCAE guidelines as follows: 
For each target report the errors in the speed, ∆s, and in the heading, ∆φ, were calculated: 
∆s   = (Known speed - Reported speed) in m/s 
∆φ   = (Known heading - Reported heading) in degrees 
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The resulting data was used to calculate the mean speed and heading errors according to the 
following formulae, where i = 1,2,3,…n and n is the number of reports: 
Mean deviation in speed, ms  = ∑ ∆si/n 
Mean deviation in heading, mφ  = ∑ ∆ φ i/n  
 
Then, the RVA was calculated using the following formulae: 
RVAs  = C*√(∑ (∆si – ms)2/n) + ms   
RVAφ  = C*√(∑ (∆φI – mφ)2/n) + mφ   
 
where the coefficient C is set to 1.960 for the required 95% confidence level. 
Result 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
 
Known Speed  
m/s 
n ms RVAs 
m/s 
mφ RVAφ 
degrees 
4.2 40 -0.003 0.6 0.351 7.9 
9.7 71 0.04 0.8 -1.18 4.9 
25.8 240 -0.002 1.2 1.12 2.4 
Table 2-6: RVA Test Result 
2.3.9 Probability of Identification (VE-9) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-9 
The probability that the correct identity of an aircraft, vehicle or object1 is reported at the output 
of the SDF should be 99.9% at minimum. 
 
Test Procedure 
a) Short-Term Test (performed at SAT) 
The test scenario was the same as for the CV test (see VE-1 above).  
More than six thousand target reports were analysed from the recorded data. The targets used for the 
analysis were the test vehicle and identifiable aircraft moving on the aerodrome Movement Area. The 
criterion for determining that an aircraft was an identifiable target was that target reports were 
received from the MLAT system. The criteria for correct identification were that: 
• The target report for the test vehicle contained the identifier FOLLOW3; and 
• The target report for an aircraft contained the ICAO Aircraft Identification (Callsign) as 
entered in the flight plan. 
From the recorded data, the Probability of Identification (PID) was calculated according to 
EUROCAE guidelines as follows: 
                                                     
1 Assuming that the object is identifiable, i.e. suitably equipped and cooperating. 
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%100⋅=
getstarleidentifiabfromreportsofnumberTotal
tionidentificacorrectwithreportsgetartofNumber
PID  
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
First, the MOGADOR tool was used to calculate the PID for the same data as for the short-term tests. 
This MOGADOR result was compared with the calculated value to confirm that the MOGADOR was 
correctly calibrated.  
MOGADOR was then used to assess the PID for the longer period (4 weeks). 
 
Result 
a) Short-Term Test 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
File: “Follow3.txt” recorded 15 March 2005, starting at 13:30 UTC. 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
 
Area Mobile Type Total No. of 
Reports 
No. of Correctly 
Identified Reports 
PID 
Aircraft 1472 1472 100% RWY 
Test vehicle 251 251 100% 
Aircraft 2830 2822 99.72% TWY 
Test vehicle 1730 1730 100% 
Table 2-7: Results of Probability of Identification Test 
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
For the evaluation, three days with good weather-conditions (no snow, no precipitation) and seven 
days with non-optimal conditions (snow and precipitation) are taken into consideration. The following 
figures show the results for the PID for the different types of mobiles (All, Aircraft, Vehicle and 
Unknown) and the three locations Runways, Obstacle Free Zone (OFZ) and Taxiways. The results are 
grouped by the named weather conditions. 
NOTE: There is no identification for Unknown targets, because if a target is identified it is either the 
identification of an Aircraft or a Vehicle. 
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Figure 2-16: PID Long Term Observation (excellent weather conditions (no snow, no precipitation)) 
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Figure 2-17: PID Long Term Observation (no optimal weather conditions (snow, sunshine)) 
During the analysis of the PID with MOGADOR it has been discovered that tracks of aircraft are put 
together with tracks of other aircraft, due to the algorithm of the path-reconstruction-method. The 
vehicles are not linked with other vehicle or aircraft, because the identification is taken as reliable. 
Therefore the PID of Vehicle is 100%. The wrong combination of different aircraft is a tuning 
problem of the evaluation tool and has to be solved in the next version of MOGADOR. 
2.3.10 Probability of False Identification (VE-10) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-10 
The probability that the identity reported at the output of the SDS is not the correct identity of 
the actual aircraft, vehicle, or object should not exceed 10E-3 per reported target. 
 
Test Procedure 
a) Short-Term Test (performed at SAT) 
The test scenario was the same as for the CV test (see VE-1 above).  
More than six thousand target reports were analysed from the recorded data. The targets used for the 
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analysis were the test vehicle and identifiable aircraft moving on the aerodrome Movement Area. The 
criteria for correct identification were that: 
• The target report for the test vehicle contained an identifier other than the correct identifier 
FOLLOW3; and 
• The target report for an aircraft contained an identifier other than the ICAO Aircraft 
Identification (Callsign) as entered in the flight plan. 
 
From the recorded data, the Probability of False Identification (PFID) was calculated according to 
EUROCAE guidelines as follows: 
 
%100⋅=
reportsgettarofnumberTotal
tionidentificaerroneouswithreportsgettarofNumberPFID  
 
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
The test scenario was the same as for the CV test (see VE-1 above).  
First, the MOGADOR tool was used to calculate the PFID for the same data as for the short-term tests. 
This MOGADOR result was compared with the calculated value to confirm that the MOGADOR was 
correctly calibrated.  
MOGADOR was then used to assess the PFID for the longer period (4 weeks). 
 
Result 
a) Short-Term Test 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
File: “Follow3.txt” recorded 15 March 2005, starting at 13:30 UTC. 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
 
Area Mobile Type Total No. of 
Reports 
No. of Wrongly 
Identified Reports 
PFID 
Aircraft 1472 0 0.00% RWY 
Test vehicle 251 0 0.00% 
Aircraft 2830 0 0.00% TWY 
Test vehicle 1730 0 0.00% 
Table 2-8: Results of Probability of False Identification Test 
 
b) Long-Term Test (MOGADOR) 
For the evaluation, three days with good weather-conditions (no snow, no precipitation) and seven 
days with non-optimal conditions (snow and precipitation) are taken into consideration. The following 
figures show the results for the PFD for the different types of mobiles (All, Aircraft, Vehicle and 
Unknown) and the three locations Runways, Obstacle Free Zone (OFZ) and Taxiways. The results are 
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grouped by the named weather conditions. 
NOTE: There is no false identification for Unknown targets, because if a target is identified, it is either 
the identification of an Aircraft or a Vehicle. 
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Figure 2-18: PFID Long Term Observation (excellent weather conditions (no snow, no precipitation)) 
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Figure 2-19: PFID Long Term Observation (no optimal weather conditions (snow, sunshine)) 
During the analysis of PFID with MOGADOR it has been discovered that tracks of aircraft are put 
together with tracks of other aircraft, due to the algorithm of the path-reconstruction-method. The 
vehicles are not linked with other vehicle or aircraft, because the identification is taken as reliable. 
Therefore the PFID of Vehicles is 0%.  
The wrong combination of different aircraft is a tuning problem of the evaluation tool and has to be 
solved in the next version of MOGADOR. 
 
2.3.11 Target Report Update Rate (VE-11) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-11 
An updated target report should be transmitted from the SDS to the clients at least once per 
second for each target. 
 
Test Procedure 
The test scenario was the same as for the CV test (see VE-1 above).  
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The traffic situation display on the CWP was observed during a period of heavy traffic to confirm that 
each target is updated at least once per second. 
More than six thousand target reports from the test vehicle and identified aircraft were analysed from 
the recorded data. These data were used to calculate the average Target Report Update Rate (TRUR) 
and the distribution. 
 
Result 
File: “Follow3.txt” recorded 15 March 2005, starting at 13:30 UTC. 
File: “alltracks.txt” recorded 16 March 2005, 10:40 to 11:40 UTC. 
 
No. of Reports Average 
TRUR 
Variance 
6283 0.47 s 0.22 s 
Table 2-9: TRUR Test Result 
 
 
2.3.12 Probability of Detection of an Alert Situation (VE-12) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-12 
The probability of detection of an alert situation should be greater than 99.9% 
 
Test Procedure 
The RIMCAS tool at the CWP-3 (Tower Executive Controller) position was set manually for low 
visibility conditions. This means that the tool shall generate an alert for the following scenarios: 
• An aircraft approaching a runway to land shall generate an alert if another target is detected 
within the Runway Protected Area and the time to threshold (TTT) is calculated to be less than 
a pre-defined parameter value. For the Prague tests, this value was set to 45s for Stage 1 
(Prediction) and 30s for Stage 2 (Alert) in LVC. 
• A landing aircraft shall generate a Stage 2 alert if there is another target detected ahead of it 
within the Runway Protected Area. 
• A departing aircraft that has entered a runway shall generate a Stage 1 alert if there is another 
target detected within the ground boundary defined by the Runway Protected Area.  
• A departing aircraft on a runway shall generate a Stage 2 alert if its speed exceeds a pre-
defined parameter value and there is another target detected ahead of it within the Runway 
Protected Area. For Prague in LVC, the parameter value is set to 20m/s.  
 
The Runway Protected Area was configured as the ground boundary defined by the Cat II / III holding 
positions for the runway. 
This test was conducted during good visibility conditions and during a period of the day with medium 
to heavy traffic. Two hours of visual observation were used to confirm that the correct alerts were 
given at the CWP-3 Controller HMI.  
For each scenario, it was noted whether the RIMCAS tool gave the correct alert according to the 
configured rules.  
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The recorded data was used to calculate the Probability of Detecting an Alert Situation (PDAS) in 
accordance with the EUROCAE guidelines: 
 
%100⋅=
situationsalertactualofnumberTotal
reportsalertcorrectofNumberPDAS  
 
Result 
Test performed 10 November 2005, 12:00 UTC to 14:00 UTC. 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
With the chosen set-up, there were alerts for every arriving and departing aircraft since mobiles 
entering the runways used the CAT I holding positions but the EMMA system was configured for low 
visibility conditions. Under these conditions, a mobile crossing the CAT II/III hold line should 
generate an alert if the runway is occupied by an arriving or departing aircraft. 
 
Alert Type Total No. of 
Alert Situations 
No. of Correct 
Alert Reports 
PDAS 
Arrival, Stage 1 12 12 100% 
Arrival, Stage 2 12 12 100% 
Departure, Stage 1 27 27 100% 
Departure, Stage 2 2 2 100% 
Table 2-10: Probability of Detecting an Alert Situation 
 
2.3.13 Probability of False Alert (VE-13) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-13 
The probability of false alert should be less than 10E-3 
 
Test Procedure 
The test procedure was the same as for the PDAS test (see VE-12 above).  
For each scenario, it was noted whether the RIMCAS tool gave an incorrect (false) alert according to 
the configured rules.  
The recorded data was used to calculate the Probability of False Alert (PFA) in accordance with the 
EUROCAE guidelines: 
 
movementsaircraftofnumberTotal
alertsfalseofNumberPFA =  
 
Result 
Test performed 10 November 2005, 12:00 UTC to 14:00 UTC. 
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Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
There were no false alerts during the period of the test. However, the test period was not sufficiently 
long for this to be meaningful result for the value of the PFA indicator. Therefore, this indicator was 
evaluated during the operational on-site trials. Refer to Chapter 6 for the results of the operational 
tests.  
 
2.3.14 Alert Response Time (VE-14) 
 
Hypothesis 
VE-14 
Having received the target report from the surveillance element, the time taken for the Control 
function to detect and report any alert situation should be not more than 0.5 s. 
 
Test Procedure 
The test procedure was the same as for the PDAS test (see VE-12 above).  
Whenever an alert situation occurred, the time (t1) at which the conflict situation was created by a 
mobile crossing the ground boundary and the time (t2) at which the alert report was given at the CWP 
was estimated and noted. Since no special tools were available, only a rough estimation was possible. 
The Alert Response Time (ART) was calculated in accordance with the EUROCAE guidelines: 
 
∑− −= ni in ttART 1 )12(  
 
 
Result 
Test performed 10 November 2005, 12:00 UTC to 14:00 UTC. 
Weather condition: Fine and clear, no precipitation. 
 
Twelve alert situations were used for the analysis. 
 
No. of Alert 
Situations 
ART 
12 < 0,5 s 
Table 2-11: Result of ART Test 
 
2.3.15 Routing Process Time (VE-15) 
Not applicable for Prague. 
 
2.3.16 Probability of Continuous Track (VE-16) 
VE-16 Each target track should be continuously updated with a new position report at the nominal 
update rate of the system throughout the Movement. 
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Test Procedure 
The Mogador tool was used to determine the Probability of Continuous Track (PCT). Gaps (i.e. 
missing position reports) in each target track were counted and a table was filled out.  
From the tables, the MOGADOR tool calculated the value of the PCT. 
 
Result 
In the table below, the size of a gap corresponds to the number of missing target reports for that gap. 
Only tracks corresponding to a wanted target are taken into consideration. Gaps do not include coasted 
targets. 
 
Size of Gap 1 2 3 4 5 >5 
No. of Occurrences of that Gap  44876 1277 399 198 111 1361
Table 2-12: Results of Track Continuity Test (excellent weather conditions (no snow, no precipitation)) 
 
Size of Gap 1 2 3 4 5 >5 
No. of Occurrences of that Gap  9596 1333 523 213 136 1136
Table 2-13: Results of Track Continuity Test (no optimal weather conditions (snow, sunshine)) 
As in the last sections with detection and identification, three days with good weather-conditions (no 
snow, no precipitation) and seven days with no optimal conditions (snow and precipitation) are taken 
into consideration. 
 
2.3.17 Matrix of Detection (VE17) 
The matrix of detection is a table, which is used to assess the distribution of detection losses, 
according to their frequency and duration. It complements the PCT. 
 
Test Procedure 
Gaps (i.e. missing position reports) were counted for every valid track. Then, the duration of each gap 
was measured. These values were transformed to the occurrence percentage per flight and filled out a 
table as shown below.  
As in the last chapters with detection and identification, three days with good weather-conditions (no 
snow, no precipitation) and seven days with no optimal conditions (snow and/or precipitation) are 
taken into consideration. The two tables show the percentage of gaps per day for the two periods. 
The table is arranged so that the least interrupted tracks are displayed near the upper-left corner, and 
the most interrupted are displayed near the lower-right corner. 
 
Results 
The total number of valid tracks for the computation of percentages for theMatrix of Detection (good 
weather) was 11651. 
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  Duration of Gaps (number of missing reports) 
All movements (%) 1s 2s 3s 4s 5s >5s Total 
0 47,06 47,06 
1 5,57 1,27 0,51 0,54 0,27 8,18 16,34 
2 1,87 0,50 0,25 0,32 0,18 4,21 7,32 
3 1,14 0,30 0,17 0,17 0,11 2,94 4,84 
4 0,80 0,22 0,09 0,07 0,04 2,02 3,24 
5 0,51 0,17 0,07 0,04 0,04 1,15 1,99 
>5 7,75 3,31 1,58 0,53 0,26 5,78 19,21 
Number 
of gaps 
of a 
valid 
track 
Total 17,65 5,78 2,67 1,67 0,90 24,27 100,00 
Table 2-14: Matrix of Detection for all Movements with Good Weather Conditions (no snow, no 
precipitation) [%] 
 
The total number of valid tracks for the computation of percentages for theMatrix of Detection 
(adverse weather) was 21263. 
 
 
 
 Duration of Gaps (number of missing reports) 
All movements (%) 1s 2s 3s 4s 5s >5s Total 
0 40,73 40,73 
1 8,18 2,69 1,08 0,43 0,14 4,65 17,18 
2 3,55 1,71 0,91 0,40 0,16 3,11 9,83 
3 2,02 1,36 0,60 0,33 0,10 2,45 6,87 
4 1,02 0,94 0,53 0,27 0,09 2,02 4,87 
5 0,73 0,69 0,37 0,26 0,06 1,69 3,80 
>5 1,97 2,59 2,22 1,30 0,37 8,28 16,72 
Number 
of gaps 
of a 
valid 
track 
Total 17,48 9,99 5,70 2,99 0,91 22,21 100,00 
Table 2-15: Matrix of Detection for all Movements with Adverse Weather Conditions (snow or/and 
precipitation) [%] 
 
2.3.18 Matrix of Identification (VE-18) 
The matrix of identification is a table, which is used to assess the distribution of identification losses 
and erroneous identifications, according to their frequency and duration. This metric is not related to a 
performance requirement but has a describing character.  
 
Test Procedure 
Gaps in correct identification were counted for every valid track. Then, the duration of each gap was 
measured. These values were transformed to the occurrence percentage per flight and used to fill out a 
table as shown below.  
Two types of matrix were created, in order to assess the probability of the occurrence of: 
• Missing identification  
• Wrong identification 
 
In addition to that, it can also be distinguished between the following: 
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• Missing identification with valid mode A codes 
• Missing identification with erroneous mode A codes 
• Missing identification with missing mode A codes 
 
However, these data are not reported here because they are mainly used to investigate the reasons for 
missing or wrong identification and are of less operational significance. 
 
Result 
The complete number of valid tracks for the computation of the Matrices of Identification was 11651. 
 There are only three days with good weather-conditions (no snow, no precipitation) taken into 
consideration. The reason for that was that the Identification is only depending on the MLAT and the 
Flight –Plan Data, which are independent from the weather. The two tables show the occurrence of 
gaps for Missing identification and False identification. 
Long-Term Test (MOGADOR): 
 
  Duration of Gaps (number of missing identifiers) 
 All (%) 1s 2s 3s 4s 5s >5s Total 
0 72,90 72,90 
1 1,24 0,50 1,44 1,42 1,18 8,70 14,47 
2 0,15 0,29 0,58 0,48 0,29 4,22 6,01 
3 0,03 0,07 0,08 0,18 0,14 1,90 2,39 
4 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,10 0,88 1,10 
5 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,67 0,75 
>5 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,05 0,05 2,24 2,38 
Number 
of gaps 
of a 
valid 
track 
Total 1,44 0,88 2,17 2,20 1,79 18,62 100,00 
Table 2-16: Missing Identification Gap Distribution (Missing label) 
 
 
  Duration of Gaps (number of false identifiers) 
 All (%) 1s 2s 3s 4s 5s >5s Total 
0 97,45 97,45 
1 0,15 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,62 0,82 
2 0,03 0,01 0,04 0,03 0,01 0,41 0,52 
3 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,21 0,21 
4 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,22 0,23 
5 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,09 
>5 0,00 0,01 0,03 0,00 0,02 0,62 0,68 
Number 
of gaps 
of a 
valid 
track 
Total 0,17 0,03 0,09 0,05 0,05 2,16 100,00 
Table 2-17: Wrong Identification Gap Distribution (Wrong label) 
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2.4 Summary of Technical Results 
The table below summarises the results for all measured individual verification metrics. 
Measured Value ID Indicator Acronym Requirement 
Short-Term Long-
Term 
VE-1 Coverage Volume CV Approaches 
Manoeuvring Area 
Apron taxi lines 
√ 
√ 
√ 
n.a. 
VE-2 Probability of Detection PD ≥ 99.9% 99.65% 97,1 – 
99,4% 
VE-3 Probability of False Detection PFD < 10E-3 per Reported 
Target 
0.07% 0,04 – 
0,16% 
VE-4 Reference Point RP Not defined 2-20 m n.a. 
VE-5 Reported Position Accuracy RPA ≤ 7.5 m  
at a confidence level of 
95% 
3.2 m 
(static) 
n.a. 
VE-6 Reported Position Resolution RPR ≤ 1 m  0.1 m n.a. 
VE-7 Reported Position 
Discrimination 
RPD Not defined Not tested n.a. 
VE-8 Reported Velocity Accuracy RVA Speed:  ≤ 5 m/s 
Direction: ≤ 10° 
at a confidence level of 
95% 
1.2 m/s 
7.9° 
n.a. 
VE-9 Probability of Identification PID ≥ 99.9% for identifiable 
Targets 
99.72% 78,8 – 
94,1% 
VE-10 Probability of False 
Identification 
PFID < 10E-3 per Reported 
Target 
0.00% 3,2 – 
19,7% 
VE-11 Target Report Update Rate TRUR ≤ 1 s  
 
0.47 s n.a. 
VE-12 Probability of Detection of an 
Alert Situation 
PDAS ≥ 99.9% 100% n.a. 
VE-13 Probability of False Alert PFA < 10E-3 per Alert Insufficient 
data 
n.a. 
VE-14 Alert Response Time ART ≤ 0.5 s  
 
<0.5 s n.a. 
VE-15 Routing Process Time RPT < 10 s n.a. n.a. 
VE-16 Probability of Continuous Track PCT Not specified n.a. See 2.3.16
VE-17 Matrix of Detection MOD Not specified n.a. See 2.3.17
VE-18 Matrix of Identification MOI Not specified n.a. See 2.3.18
Table 2-18: Summary of Technical Verification Results 
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3 Real Time Simulation Results 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Participants 
A total of 11 ANS-CR controllers in four groups participated in the two phases of the EMMA real 
time simulations. There were five controllers with the 1st phase and six with the 2nd RTS phase.  
 
Controllers of the first phase were confronted with conflict scenarios to test operational feasibility and 
operational improvements of the A-SMGCS conflict alert service. Controllers of the second RTS 
phase did also use the conflict alert service but the traffic scenarios went without evoked conflicts. 
Separated from the experimental RTS 2 exercises controllers of the 3rd and 4th group (RTS2) were 
requested to perform a test run using electronic flight stripes and a departure manager and to give their 
comments to this new A-SMGCS service (cf. 3.4).  
 
All participants were male. The table below outlines the distribution of the controllers to the RTS 
phases. 
 
Subject Sex RTS phase Conflict scenarios Groups 
C1 M 1 X 
C2 M 1 X 
C3 M 1 X 
1st group 
C4 M 1 X 
C5 M 1 X 
2nd group 
C6 M 2  
C7 M 2  
C8 M 2  
3rd group 
C9 M 2  
C10 M 2  
C11 M 2  
4th group 
Table 3-1: Allocation of Controllers to the Groups and RTS Phases 
3.1.2 Experimental Design 
The experimental design is based on the use of real experiments. In real experiments, the same 
scenarios are used for the Baseline System and the A-SMGCS set-up in order to achieve ceteris paribus 
conditions. In this way, results from the Baseline system can be directly compared with the  
A-SMGCS within a traffic scenario. However, a comparison of traffic characteristics between the 
traffic scenarios is lacking the different amount of traffic and runway configurations because Prague 
regulations do allow only low or medium traffic and runway 24 operations with CATII/III conditions 
in low visibility. Scenario A and B uses other runway configurations and more traffic volume because 
the operate with VIS2 and VIS1 conditions respectively. 
 
In conclusion, the following matrix shows the experiment set-up in terms of experimental factors: 
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 SYS 1 SMGCS (Baseline) 
SYS 2 
A-SMGCS Level II 
VIS 1 (scenario B) X X 
VIS 2 (scenario A) X X 
VIS 3 (scenario C) X X 
Table 3-2: Combination of Experimental Factors 
 
As already mentioned above, emphasis has been put on realistic traffic scenarios to measure the 
potential influence of using an A-SMGCS at Prague Airport. Realistic scenarios go with realistic 
traffic amounts in accordance to the visibility conditions, which comply with the local CAT II/III 
regulation. This mixture of traffic amount and visibility prevents an objective comparison of 
operational improvements between visibility conditions. However, comparison between A-SMGCS 
and Baseline are the most wanted and reveal significant operational improvements. The following 
table shows the details of the traffic used scenarios. 
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 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
QFU ↑24 ↓31 ↑06 ↓13 ↑24 ↓24 
APP ILS CAT I VOR/DME ILS CAT II/III 
Weather conditions Day (night?) 
350/10  
2km visibility (VIS2) 
 
Day 
130/15  
5km visibility (VIS1) 
 
Day 
VRB/2 RVR  
400m visibility (VIS3) 
Timing ~ 60’ ~ 60’ ~ 60’ 
Movements ~ 35 ~ 41 ~ 25 
Constraints TWY RR U/S RWY 04/22 U/S 
TWY A, B U/S 
ILS 06 U/S 
ALS 06 U/S 
NIL 
Allowed TFC ↑24 ↓31 (↓24 + ↑31 on 
request) 
↑06 ↓13 (↑13 on request) ↑24 ↓24 
Possible conflicts 
or malfunctions2 
↓31 x ↑24 
↓31 x ↓24 
↑31 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑31 
↑31 x ↑24 
↑31 x ↓31 
↑24 x ↓24 
↑31 x ↑31 
↑24 x ↑24 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Wrong direction 
↑06 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↓13 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑13 
↓13 x ↑13 
↑06 x ↑06 
↑13 x ↑13 
 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Wrong direction 
↓24 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑24 
↑24 x ↑24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Wrong direction 
Conflicts or 
malfunctions of 
interest3 
↓31 x ↑24 
↓31 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑31 
↑31 x ↑24 
Wrong direction 
↑06 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↓13 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑06 
↓13 x ↑13 
↓24 x ↓24 
↓24 x ↑24 
↑24 x ↑24 
Wrong label 
Label lost 
Symbol convention: 
↓  Conflicting aircraft during approach, landing or landing roll 
↓ Conflicting aircraft after landing during taxiing (e.g. RWY crossing) 
↑ Conflicting aircraft during take-off run, take-off or initial climb out 
↑ Conflicting aircraft before take-off during taxiing (e.g. holding point for same or crossing 
RWY crossed etc.) 
↓24 Conflicting aircraft for RWY 24 
x Versus (e.g. ↓24 x ↑24) 
 
Table 3-3: RTS Traffic Scenario Description 
 
                                                     
2 only with RTS 1 
3 only with RTS 1 
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3.1.3 Experimental Course 
With the test plan, it was aimed to completely randomise all experimental condition to retain the best 
test power. However, due to technical problems and lacking availability of controllers this aim could 
not be fully achieved. With the first group, traffic scenario A had technical malfunctions. The second 
group lacked the 3rd controller, so that the TPC position had to be abandoned. The 3rd and 4th groups 
were affected by less available test days so that a full randomisation could not be achieved. However, 
the final distribution of the controllers to the CWP, scenarios and system conditions is sufficient to 
derive meaningful test results. 
 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
 A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline 
 TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC
C1       X X X X X X X X X X X X 
C2       X X X X X X X X X X X X 
C3       X X X X X X X X X X X X 
C4  X X  X X  X X  X X  X X  X X 
C5  X X  X X  X X  X X  X X  X X 
C6  X   X    X   X X   X   
C7 X   X    X   X    X   X 
C8   X   X X       X   X  
C9  X   X    X   X X   X   
C10 X   X    X   X    X   X 
C11   X   X X   X    X   X  
Table 3-4: Distribution of the Controllers to the Test Conditions 
 
The Real-Time Simulation used the Real-time Tower Simulator at DLR-Braunschweig. The 
Validation Platform is described in the EMMA Prague test plan [13]. 
Within this document and with all Prague test trials, the term “A-SMGCS” includes the following 
services: 
• At A-SMGCS Level I, additional surveillance information from the data fusion of 
cooperative and non-cooperative surveillance sensors provides a seamless coverage of the 
entire Movement Area. Controllers are provided with a labelled Traffic Situation Display. 
• A-SMGCS Level II complements the A-SMGCS Level I Surveillance Service with a Control 
Service, the objective of which is to detect potentially dangerous conflicts in order to improve 
safety of runways and restricted areas. Controllers are provided with an automated system 
function (RIMCAS) for detecting and alerting them of potential conflicts. 
 
3.1.4 Technical and Operational approval of the RTS 
To assure that the implemented A-SMGCS works properly and to assure that the traffic scenarios are 
operational usable, a technician and a separate controller checked whether the A-SMGCS had been 
implemented correctly and that all functions worked properly before starting the operational trials. 
 
Operational Considerations 
From an operational point of view, it has to be concluded that the testing of operational improvements 
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(safety, efficiency, etc.) was influenced by testing of the operational feasibility of the monitoring and 
alerting service with the 1st phase of RTS trials. Several conflict situations had been revealed by the 
pseudo-pilot that were needed to test the controllers’ reaction time and their acceptance, but also 
influenced the normal controllers’ behaviour. With the 2nd RTS, conflict situations were not further 
induced in order to measure operational improvements without impact of non-nominal events. 
 
Technical Drawbacks that could not be solved for RTS I: 
• RWY Stop bar alert in CATII/III did not work 
• Restricted area alert did not work 
• “Wrong direction take off” was not established 
• No extended label – only call-sign in it 
• Vis2 and Vis3 outside view could be lower 
• No manual labelling possible 
• Label colour of cars was not brown (as desired) but white (same as departure, as cars had to be 
defined as aircraft in the simulation scenario) 
• Pseudo-pilots could not stop the aircraft in time when needed 
• T2 alerts with RWY13 arrivals and stopped traffic on TWY F 
• Permanent T1 (amber) alert on TWY F between TWY D and RWY31/13 
• Sensitive area is too long on TWY F between TWY D and RWY31/13 with Crossing traffic 
on RWY31/13 
• No text in label – several times 
• Missing label with arrivals on RWY13 between threshold and intersection to TWY F 
• With setting the “Suppression” Area 2, labels on Apron North disappear (as wanted) but also 
with vacating traffic from RWY13 
• No editing possible 
• Sometimes orange T1 alert with acoustic warnings, which is wrong 
• Car alone on TWY F and orange T1 alert, which is wrong. 
 
3.2 Operational Feasibility (RTS) 
3.2.1 Acceptance questionnaire results 
Each of the 11 ANS_CR Controllers was given a 30 items acceptance questionnaire after finishing all 
test runs. They were asked to give their opinion to the use of A-SMGCS. The answering scale reached 
from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 10 “Strongly agree”. The following general hypothesis was set up to 
describe the expectation with the controllers’ answers: 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OF-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “operational feasibility” aspects of a 
specific item. 
OF-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “operational feasibility” aspects of a specific 
item. 
 
11 x 30 answers were achieved that are summed up with the following table: 
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 Item No. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
C1 8 4 10 8 1 1 8 3 9 10 5 8 9 3 8 8 9 9 8 8 9 7 8 8 3 9 8 8 6 7 
C2 9 3 9 8 3 1 9 2 8 9 5 9 9 2 9 8 8 9 6 10 8 7 8 9 6 9 9 7 3 8 
C3 8 2 8 9 2 1 10 3 9 8 6 7 8 3 7 8 9 9 8 7 7 7 9 8 6 9 7 6 6 7 
C4 8 4 8 7 2 1 10 3 9 9 6 8 9 3 7 8 8 8 7 8 8 9 8 8 4 9 8 7 5 7 
C5 8 2 10 7 3 1 9 1 8 9 6 8 8 3 9 8 7 9 8 7 6 9 10 9 3 8 6 9 4 8 
C6 9 3 10 8 1 1 8 3 8 9 6 8 9 3 9 7 8 9 8 8 7 9 9 9 3 8 9 6 4 9 
C7 9 4 6 9 1 1 9 1 9 9 8 7 8 3 8 9 7 8 8 10 8 8 8 8 3 9 8 6 6 9 
C8 8 3 9 9 1 2 8 4 9 10 5 8 9 4 8 9 7 8 8 10 9 7 8 9 4 9 7 7 4 9 
C9 9 4 6 7 1 2 8 4 9 8 8 7 8 2 9 7 9 8 7 7 8 9 9 9 4 9 7 7 4 8 
C10 7 3 6 8 3 2 10 1 9 8 7 7 8 3 7 9 8 8 8 7 7 7 8 8 6 8 7 8 5 9 
C11 9 3 6 9 3 1 8 2 8 10 6 8 8 3 9 9 9 8 8 8 6 7 8 9 3 8 7 7 6 8 
C = Controller 
Table 3-5: Raw Data of the RTS Acceptance Questionnaire 
 
By use of a t-test for a single sample size, each item was proved for its statistical significance. Table 
3-6 shows the respective results. P-value with a star* indicate its statistical significance. 
 
 Test Value = 5.5 
Item T df p (1-sided) 
ITEM01 14,087 10 ,000* 
ITEM02 -10,241 10 ,000* 
ITEM03 4,787 10 ,001* 
ITEM04 10,338 10 ,000* 
ITEM05 -12,618 10 ,000* 
ITEM06 -30,016 10 ,000* 
ITEM07 12,594 10 ,000* 
ITEM08 -8,953 10 ,000 
ITEM09 20,618 10 ,000* 
ITEM10 14,986 10 ,000* 
ITEM11 2,096 10 ,031* 
ITEM12 11,423 10 ,000* 
ITEM13 18,764 10 ,000* 
ITEM14 -15,932 10 ,000* 
ITEM15 10,178 10 ,000* 
ITEM16 11,847 10 ,000* 
ITEM17 10,338 10 ,000* 
ITEM18 18,764 10 ,000* 
ITEM19 10,510 10 ,000* 
ITEM20 7,113 10 ,000* 
ITEM21 6,550 10 ,000* 
ITEM22 7,832 10 ,000* 
ITEM23 14,252 10 ,000* 
ITEM24 19,341 10 ,000* 
ITEM25 -3,594 10 ,003* 
ITEM26 20,618 10 ,000* 
ITEM27 7,262 10 ,000* 
ITEM28 5,590 10 ,000* 
ITEM29 -2,096 10 ,031 
ITEM30 10,338 10 ,000* 
Table 3-6: T-Test for 30 items of the Acceptance questionnaire 
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8,36
3,18
8
8,09
8,81
2,45
8,63
9
6,18
7,72
8,45
2,9
8,18
8,18
8,09
8,45
7,63
8,18
7,54
7,81
8,45
8,54
4,09
8,63
7,54
7,09
4,81
8,09
1,9
1,27
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
A01 - I experienced the level of safety by using the A-SMGCS as very
high.
A02 - EMMA enabled you to handle more traffic
A03 - EMMA enabled you to provide the pilots a better level of service
A04 - EMMA enabled you to execute your tasks more efficiently
A05 - The introduction of EMMA will increase the potential of human
error
A06 - The types of human error associated with EMMA are different than
those associated with normal work
A07 - The A-SMGCS DISPLAY is easy to handle
A08 - The A-SMGCS DISPLAY provides an active, involved role for me
A09 - The A-SMGCS DISPLAY gives me support I miss with the current
systems
A10 - The use of the different windows is clear to me
A11 - Called windows appear at the expected place and size
A12 - The layout of the windows on the screen is good, i.e. the windows
are conveniently arranged
A13 - I experienced textual representation as appropriate
A14 - In general, automated features within the A-SMGCS DISPLAY
behave in ways that are consistent with my expectations
A15 - I experienced the mouse and the keyboard for an A-SMGCS
DISPLAY input device as well-suitable
A16 - All information I need to accomplish a ATC instructions is
available
A17 - The display colours chosen in the A-SMGCS DISPLAY are
satisfying
A18 - The contrast between the windows and their background is
sufficient
A19 - The layout of the A-SMGCS DISPLAY is good, i.e. the information
is conveniently arranged and the amount of information in is not to
large
A20 - The different information is easy to find
A21 - Visual coding techniques help me maintain productive scanning
A22 - Different colour codes are easy to interpret
A23 - The used symbols are easy to interpret
A24 - Symbols can easily be read under different angle of view
A25 - Labels, terms and abbreviations chosen in the A-SMGCS
DISPLAY are easy to interpret
A26 - The height and width of characters are sufficient
A27 - The A-SMGCS DISPLAY provides me with the right information in
the right time
A28 - Sometimes information was displayed, which I did not need
A29 - The number of keystrokes (or other control actions) necessary to
interact with the system is kept to a minimum
A30 - I experienced the level of safety by using the A-SMGCS DISPLAY
as high
0,00 0,05 0,10 0,15 0,20 0,25 0,30 0,35 0,40 0,45 0,50 0,55  
Figure 3-1: Bar Chart for Means, SD, and p-values for 30 items from the RTS Acceptance Questionnaire 
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The bar chart with Figure 3-1 gives a good overview about the answers to each item. The mean value 
is 5.54, which is represented by the blue line. Except for item 08 and item 29 all statements have been 
answered towards the expected end of the scale. The p-values are represented by the scale of the lower 
horizontal axis, the 0.05 yellow line and the yellow bars on top of the red bars. No yellow bar exceeds 
the critical 0.05% line, which expresses the statistical significance of all items5. 
 
Concluding Results 
28 of 30 acceptance items have been significantly answered by 11 controllers in the expected 
direction. Therefore, it can be stated that the use of the A-SMGCS in the two RTS phases was of high 
operational feasibility. 
 
3.2.2 Debriefing Comments 
After finishing all test runs, each controller was given the chance to express his general comments, 
suggestions, and criticisms about the A-SMGCS. The following comments have been highlighted 
here: 
 
• Immediate T2 alerts with crossing departing or landing aircraft are not desirable for the 
controllers – amber would be better - or red, when better tuned 
• Controllers could imagine a big and separate “resolution button” to tell the automation that the 
conflict situation is under control or resolved 
• One acoustic alert peep would be sufficient to make the controller aware of a conflict 
• With the “Time-to-threshold” window, the line 15sec is missing 
o Would also prefer distance instead of time because of the ATC separation rules 
o Time is also advantageous, but more with a smaller scale (perhaps 3 or 5 sec.) 
o Controller 2 prefers to see the timing with “15sec and more”, instead of “15sec and 
less” 
• When more than one target on the RWY an orange alert is given, which has been estimated as 
potentially useful, but: 
o not with diverging targets  
o not with RWY31/13 crossing with TWY F and RWY24/06 (arrivals and departures) 
o not with RWY31/13 crossing with TWY F and RWY13 arrived aircraft that are 
already behind this crossing area. 
                                                     
4 The figure’s mean line is not exactly 5,5, which resulted from a MS Excel drawback that does not support such a mean line in a proper way. 
5 Except for item 08 and 29 that are answered in the non-expected direction. 
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3.3 Operational Improvements (RTS) 
With the Prague Test Plan [13] high-level and low-level V&V objectives were translated into 
measurable indicators and measurement instruments. The following table gives an overview about the 
operational improvements that were intended to be measured with the real-time simulation exercises. 
 
High-level 
Objective 
Low-level Objective Indicator Measurement 
Instruments 
Obj./ 
Sub. 
Reduced number of 
incidents and accidents  
1. Number of incidents and 
accidents 
Observations Obj. Safety 
Faster identification and 
mitigation of safety hazards 
2. Time for conflict 
detection, identification, 
and resolution 
Observations  
 
Obj. 
Higher maximum number 
of aircraft handled 
1. Number of aircraft 
handled6 
Recordings Obj. 
Lower holding time per 
aircraft 
2. Holding Time7 Recordings  Obj. 
Lower Taxi Time for in and 
outbound traffic 
3. Taxi Time Recordings  Obj. 
Lower duration of radio 
communications 
4. Duration of radio 
communications (R/T load) 
Recordings Obj. 
Efficiency/ 
Capacity 
Lower number of requests 
to the pilot to report her/his 
position 
 
5. Number of requests to 
the pilot to report her/his 
position8 
 
Observations Obj. 
Higher Situation Awareness 1. Situational Awareness SASHA_Q 
SASHA_ on-Line 
Sub. Human Factors 
Convenient level of 
workload 
2. Workload I.S.A  Sub. 
Table 3-7: Low-level Objectives, Indicators, and Measurement Instruments for Measuring operational 
improvements in the RTS 
 
3.3.1 Safety 
3.3.1.1 Number of incidents and accidents 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-SAF1-H0 There is no difference in terms of number of incidents between the Baseline and 
the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-SAF1-H1 The number of incidents decreases as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS 
application and the related procedures. 
 
                                                     
6 The “number of aircraft handled by the controllers” was given by the traffic scenario itself. Differences in terms of efficiency can be seen 
with the “taxi time” 
7 The “holding time” of aircraft during taxiing could not be recorded. 
8 As the surveillance service worked with a 100% performance there was no need for the controller to request a pilot to report her/his 
position. In the baseline condition in VIS3 procedural control was applied. Differences in terms of efficiency can be seen in the “R/T load”. 
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No accidents were observed during the RTS. Incidents occurred but they were caused by the pseudo-
pilots and thus were not human errors in terms of controller mistakes. In general, Controller errors are 
very rare and thus hard to assess in test trials. 
The H0 hypothesis OI-SAF1-H0 could not be rejected with the used experimental design. 
 
3.3.1.2 Reaction Time for Conflict Detection 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-SAF2-H0 There is no difference in terms of time between the start of a conflict and 
resolution of it by the controllers between the Baseline and the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-SAF2-H1 The time between the start of a conflict and resolution of it by the controllers 
decreases as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS application and the related 
procedures. 
 
The reaction time was measured by an observer who measured the time between the initiation of a 
conflict and the reaction of a controller. The reaction of a controller was defined by the time when the 
controller contacts the pilots to resolve the conflict. Pilots in the simulation were not real pilots but 
pseudo-pilots. They were instructed to cause conflict situations, which were outlined in Table 3-3. The 
kind and number of conflict situations were adapted to the own dynamic of a traffic scenario. That’s 
why the kind and number of conflicts slightly varies between the test runs and scenarios. Therefore, 
the reaction time was summed up over the scenarios and controllers, but was separately analysed with 
respect to the controller working positions: TEC and GEC. The TPC was not affected by conflict 
situations and therefore was not analysed.  
The following tables provide the raw data of reaction time referred to the TEC and GEC control 
positions. 
 
A B C 
A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline 
6 12 14 8 13 8 
2 5 3 3 2 10 
2 7 6 2 3 6 
2 4 4 3 10 6 
2 4     
Table 3-8: Raw Data for Conflict Reaction Time for the TEC Position [sec] (RTS 1 only) 
 
 
EMMA 
Test Results PRAGUE DLR 
 
Save date: 2006-06-02 Public Page 56 
File Name: D631_Results-PRG_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
A B C 
A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline 
3 3 2 6 6 4 
  3 4 7 7 
  2 2 2 2 
  3 3 2 3 
  15 4 2 4 
    2 3 
    3 4 
    2 5 
Table 3-9: Raw Data for Conflict Reaction Time for the GEC Position [sec] (RTS 1 only) 
 
The following tables outline the statistical values and the statistical test results. A t-test for paired 
differences was conducted to prove the data for their statistical significance: 
 
 Mean N SD SE 
A-SMGCS 5,3077 13 4,32791 1,20035 TEC 
Baseline 6,0000 13 2,94392 ,81650 
Table 3-10: Means, SD, and SE for the TEC’s Reaction Time (RTS 1 only) 
 
 Mean N SD SE 
A-SMGCS 3,8571 14 3,57033 ,95421 GEC 
Baseline 3,8571 14 1,40642 ,37588 
Table 3-11: Means, SD, and SE for the GEC’s Reaction Time (RTS 1 only) 
 
6
5,37
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Reaction Time TEC [sec]
Baseline
EMMA A-
SMGCS
 
3,86 3,86
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Reaction Time GEC [sec]
Baseline
EMMA A-
SMGCS
 
Figure 3-2: Bar Charts of the Mean Reaction Time for TEC and GEC Position (RTS 1 only) 
 
  M SD SE T df p-value 
TEC A-SMGCS -
Baseline 
-0,69231 4,46065 1,23716 -0,560 12 0,30 
GEC A-SMGCS -
Baseline 0,00000 3,48624 0,93174 0,00 13 1,000 
Table 3-12: T-tests for paired differences: Reaction Time of TEC and GEC position (RTS 1 only) 
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Concluding Results 
The results show no significant differences in the “reaction time” between A-SMGCS and the baseline 
condition neither for the TEC (M = -0,69 seconds, T(12) = -0,560, p > .05) nor for the GEC position  
(M = 0,00 seconds, T(13) = 0,00, p > .05). For the TEC position, there is a trend that shows that 
controllers react faster in the A-SMGCS condition but the effect seems not that high to be proven with 
only 13 pairs of conflict situation. For the GEC position there was no difference measured. 
In addition to that, the test observer reported that reaction times are hard to measure. Particularly, 
assessing the time when a conflict is initiated or when it can be identified as a potential conflict 
situation is a rather subjective estimation by the observer. Additional error variance can be assumed 
with the fact that conflict situations are always slightly different even when they happen at the same 
time in the same traffic scenario. By so far, the sample size of conflict situations in RTS must be very 
high to randomise these side effects and to show significant differences. However, the greater the 
amount of conflict situations the less the naturalness of the traffic scenario.  
The H0 hypothesis OI-SAF2-H0 can not be rejected. 
 
3.3.2 Efficiency/Capacity  
3.3.2.1 Taxi Time 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF1-
H0 
There is no difference in terms of global taxiing time between the Baseline and the A-
SMGCS Level II. 
OI-EFF1-
H1 
The global taxiing time is reduced as an effect of introducing the A-SMGCS Level II 
application and related procedures. 
 
The taxi time was measured automatically for each aircraft starting from the gate (velocity > 0 kts) 
until the wheels left the ground (take-off) for outbound movements. For inbound movements the time 
measurement started when the wheels touched the ground (touch down) until the velocity was 0 at the 
gate or stand. 
Since identical traffic scenarios were used for A-SMGCS and Baseline trials (except of that the 
callsigns were changed to alleviate recall effects with controllers), pairs of identical taxiing aircraft 
within identical traffic scenarios could be gained. This guaranteed that measured differences could be 
claimed for better efficiency of A-SMGCS to reduce the average duration of taxi times. 
3.3.2.1.1 Raw Data 
Pairs of “taxi times” were summed up for each scenario A, B, and C dependent on in- and outbound 
traffic, and A-SMGCS vs. Baseline condition. The following raw data were recorded: 
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Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Inbound Outbound9 Inbound Outbound Inbound Outbound 
A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base 
179 181   74 454 87 85 334 319 139 172 
249 242   111 272 106 89 369 384 256 542 
259 251   277 280 230 801 379 271 331 408 
300 262   368 370 493 884 385 402 520 812 
310 490   380 526 710 743 440 470 564 615 
316 163   575 484 748 948 448 490 571 693 
332 542   602 507 778 980 522 521 583 583 
350 309   606 145 901 778 523 492 583 579 
403 367   608 683 979 1090 534 535 649 664 
512 501   614 892 987 1103 622 591 679 675 
519 549   637 585 1022 1107 155 320 723 848 
537 451   684 595 1044 1006 186 134 775 602 
575 766   33 629 1089 777 365 386 878 494 
621 616   154 665 1102 1237 367 368 83 96 
800 796   225 81 1198 1164 398 649 216 399 
191 181   492 649 85 113 426 443 323 310 
191 509   496 556 96 97 451 708 384 573 
260 255   551 504 681 1016 454 492 516 732 
280 257   552 129 685 736 579 408 531 571 
317 348   561 634 699 838 228 373 572 542 
321 375   143 244 821 832 296 321 583 716 
327 355   242 350 891 953 342 361 629 829 
366 366   274 395 967 1004 414 432 654 700 
487 573   288 278 81 90 431 404 691 939 
494 470   348 364 100 84 440 553 140 127 
509 610   364 234 461 508 499 396 264 240 
563 301   369 367 475 921 521 411 348 789 
629 719   395 468 624 844 541 691 545 934 
692 847   435 622 635 943 619 498 562 443 
794 70   457 500 654 732 646 604 586 826 
159 160   464 575 727 830 270 245 664 835 
179 270   475 516 736 907 370 320 676 1165
184 524   511 562 741 868 381 405 734 736 
233 349   513 469 794 796 385 426 772 959 
250 279   518 593 847 846 445 466 784 1215
259 401   544 580 847 964 522 546 850 839 
306 322   594 603 883 1167 637 522 85 366 
                                                     
9 Data seemed to be corrupted and did not used for the analysis. Baseline taxi times were much more longer than usual, which were properly 
caused by a systematic recording failure. 
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Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Inbound Outbound9 Inbound Outbound Inbound Outbound 
A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base 
351 334   726 597 959 1107 251 450 228 271 
366 94   215 268 991 1135 339 320 314 340 
378 569   277 323 1012 1212 381 356 395 366 
432 431   369 369 1044 1239 390 385 506 838 
488 522   386 369 102 86 398 711 546 615 
592 651   417 417 145 96 411 386 561 515 
654 744   455 372 211 358 433 462 570 753 
    476 594 405 862 438 439 632 640 
    476 421 575 1094 501 531 636 666 
    476 498 587 970 553 500 658 503 
    480 406 601 819 573 591 695 683 
    492 102 703 1089 625 745 127 136 
    495 438 717 739 636 460 242 583 
    510 557 717 754 119 398 331 801 
    511 560 827 1174 229 530 507 819 
    514 509 847 966 319 331 516 814 
    554 555 862 1068 386 386 548 1291
    674 263 871 1620 399 598 573 957 
    74 89 897 887 438 465 595 836 
    89 584 910 894 504 774 617 757 
    92 278 934 1095 514 514 635 852 
    129 516 85 110 521 521 790 1159
    217 105 91 97 579 384 1104 1180
    376 571 713 903   119 128 
    403 537 727 803   228 487 
    433 411 799 984   385 918 
    495 603 870 871   525 803 
    585 611 882 1068   578 830 
      969 1148   609 802 
          636 809 
          679 754 
          763 828 
          928 889 
Table 3-13: Taxi Time Raw Data [sec] (RTS 1) 
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Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
Inbound Outbound Inbound Outbound Inbound Outbound 
A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base A-SMGCS Base 
A-
SMGCS Base 
A-
SMGCS Base 
A-
SMGCS Base
486 686 793 673 457 399 726 797 540 412 607 607
496 471 862 658 460 463 742 1215 568 540 116 112
499 514 879 594 475 478 744 1073 604 470 352 316
523 476 905 975 483 84 763 867 72 340 406 293
525 641 1026 903 495 480 822 891 170 339 440 527
649 717 1127 1092 525 1317 859 856 336 328 462 659
716 727 129 156 570 595 866 1022 351 391 480 324
833 73 295 73 577 569 999 810 374 524 565 441
934 908 309 528 605 586 67 64 469 455 629 483
94 37 480 427 82 214 82 138 470 410 653 381
168 503 481 482 215 339 392 601 474 1329 709 403
187 192 499 856 234 234 510 581 480 555 714 890
195 180 502 569 247 215 588 781 514 554 728 618
212 158 525 500 397 475 596 807 551 401   
274 307 564 725 403 523 639 1000 561 514   
306 307 610 746 442 407 690 852     
408 288 631 778 445 524 722 967     
413 383 672 430 451 445 768 938     
416 383 689 559 468 470 795 900     
499 493 734 777 495 1401 849 1011     
503 487 964 511 511 492 919 1066     
506 451 1072 625 516 558 1107 782     
530 652   524 541       
554 519   575 593       
626 621   621 595       
841 635   681 710       
841 627           
Table 3-14: Taxi Time Raw Data (RTS 2) 
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3.3.2.1.2 Results 
 
Scenario In-or Outbound 
A-SMGCS / 
Baseline 
Average 
Taxi Time (sec) 
Difference
(sec) df t 
p-
value10 
A-SMGCS 398 In 
BASELINE 417 
-19 43 -0.786 0.22 
A-SMGCS No valid data 
A 
Out 
BASELINE No valid data 
    
A-SMGCS 414 In 
BASELINE 451 
-37 64 -1.541 0.07 
A-SMGCS 683 
B 
Out 
BASELINE 820 
-137 65 -6.370 0.00* 
A-SMGCS 431 In 
BASELINE 460 
-29 59 -1.941 0.03* 
A-SMGCS 532 
C 
Out 
BASELINE 674 
-142 69 -6.351 0.00* 
A-SMGCS 500 Total 
BASELINE 579 
-79 304 -7.728 0.00* 
Table 3-15: Taxi Time Results (RTS 1) 
 
Scenario In-or Outbound 
A-SMGCS / 
Baseline 
Average 
Taxi Time (sec) 
Difference 
(sec) df t 
p-
value11
A-SMGCS 444 In 
BASELINE 423 
21 35 0.820 0.21 
A-SMGCS 659 
A 
Out 
BASELINE 629 
30 30 0.795 0.22 
A-SMGCS 422 In 
BASELINE 497 
-75 34 -1.883 0.03* 
A-SMGCS 625 
B 
Out 
BASELINE 778 
-153 30 -4.782 0.00* 
A-SMGCS 426 In 
BASELINE 457 
-31 23 -0.734 0.24 
A-SMGCS 478 
C 
Out 
BASELINE 430 
48 21 1.732 0.05 
A-SMGCS 510 Total 
BASELINE 540 
-30 178 -1.973 0.03* 
Table 3-16: Taxi Time Results (RTS 2) 
                                                     
10 The star with a p-value shows its significance with an α = 0.05. 
11 The star with a p-value shows its significance with an α = 0.05. 
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Figure 3-3: Total average Taxi Times for RTS 1 and RTS 2 [sec] 
 
Concluding Results 
The results show significant differences in the taxi times between A-SMGCS and the Baseline 
condition for both RTS phases: For the RTS 1 (MTotal = -79 seconds, T(304) = -7,728, p < .05) and for 
the RTS 2 (MTotal = -30 seconds, T(178) = 1,973, p < .05).  
 
It has to be considered that pseudo-pilots are not affected by reduced visibility conditions and the 
speed of their controlled aircraft has always a constant level. Measured differences can only be 
interpreted as a more efficient control by the controllers using A-SMGCS.  
As the patterns of Table 3-15 and Table 3-16 show: The differences are particularly high with scenario 
B where the visibility is good but the amount of traffic is the biggest.  
Furthermore, the results of RTS 2 should be more reliable than the RTS 1 results, because lots of 
movements in RTS 1 are affected by evoked conflict situations that were not applied with RTS 2. 
However, even with RTS 1, taxi times are significantly lower with A-SMGCS compared with the 
baseline condition. 
The H0 hypothesis OI-EFF1-H0 can be rejected and the alternative hypothesis OI-EFF1-H1 can be 
assumed to be valid. This means, A-SMGCS reduces taxi times. 
 
3.3.2.2 Radio Communication Load 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-EFF4-H0 There is no difference in terms of duration of radio communications between the 
Baseline and the A-SMGCS Level II. 
OI-EFF4-H1 The total duration of radio communications is reduced as an effect of introducing 
the A-SMGCS Level II application and related procedures. 
 
With both phases of the RT-Simulations, the duration of radio communication has been measured for 
each controller working position. The duration of a test run was one hour (3600 sec). However, if a 
test run lasted longer than the 3600 seconds, the recording file was cut after 3600 seconds. Therefore, 
all present R/T durations refer to 3600 seconds overall test time. 
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3.3.2.2.1 Raw Data 
 
TPC TEC GEC 
Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS
504 576 1980 1368 1548 1260 
540 468 1872 1476 1008 1476 
648 576 1656 1332 1800 1332 
612 432 1764 1188 2124 1044 
612 468 1908 1512 1476 1656 
540 612 1800 1620 2412 1512 
miss. data miss. data 1728 1548 1620 1548 
miss. data miss. data 1620 1368 1368 1584 
miss. data miss. data 1764 1512 1800 1440 
miss. data miss. data 1764 1152 1800 1548 
miss. data miss. data 1836 1404 1224 900 
miss. data miss. data 1584 1332 1044 1260 
miss. data miss. data 1728 1692 1404 1296 
miss. data miss. data 1764 1440 1548 1476 
miss. data miss. data 1692 1260 1224 1116 
576 522 1764 1413 1481 1244 
Table 3-17: Radio Communication Load Raw Data [sec per hour] (RTS 1) 
 
TPC TEC GEC 
Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS 
684 468 1836 1800 1944 1764 
648 540 1908 1836 2268 1980 
864 576 1440 1296 1620 1476 
720 684 1980 1944 2088 1836 
576 576 1296 1152 2304 1440 
828 648 1800 1728 1368 1512 
720 582 1710 1626 1932 1668 
Table 3-18: Radio Communication Load [sec per hour] (RTS 2) 
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3.3.2.2.2 Results 
 
CWP A-SMGCS Mean 
M 
Standard Deviation 
SD 
Sample Size
N 
ASMGCS 522,0 74,6 6 
TPC 
BASE 576,0 55,7 6 
ASMGCS 1413,6 151,8 15 
TEC 
BASE 1764,0 106,2 15 
ASMGCS 1363,2 217,2 15 
GEC 
BASE 1560,0 385,9 15 
ASMGCS 1244,0 369,6 36 
Total 
BASE 1481,0 491,8 36 
Table 3-19: R/T Load Means, SD, and Sample Size (RTS 1) 
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Figure 3-4: Means of R/T Load between A-SMGCS and Baseline for each CWP [sec per hour] (RTS1) 
 
CWP A-SMGCS Mean 
M 
Standard Deviation
SD 
Sample Size 
N 
ASMGCS 582 76,9 6 
TPC 
BASE 720 109,1 6 
ASMGCS 1626 322,3 6 
TEC 
BASE 1710 275,8 6 
ASMGCS 1668 222,6 6 
GEC 
BASE 1932 371,8 6 
ASMGCS 1292 560,4 18 
Total 
BASE 1454 600,3 18 
Table 3-20: R/T Load Means, SD, and Sample Size (RTS2) 
 
EMMA 
Test Results PRAGUE DLR 
 
Save date: 2006-06-02 Public Page 65 
File Name: D631_Results-PRG_V1.0.doc Version: 1.0  
 
 
720 582
1710 1626
1932
1668
0
600
1200
1800
2400
3000
3600
TPC TEC GEC
Baseline
A-SMGCS
 
Figure 3-5: Means of R/T Load between A-SMGCS and Baseline for each CWP [sec per hour] (RTS2) 
 
UV QS df F p-
value12
CWP 9772362 2 98,606 0,000* 
ASMGCS 602402 1 12,157 0,001* 
CWP x ASMGCS 209034 2 2,109 0,129 
Error 3270456 66   
Total 147924144 72   
Table 3-21: R/T Load Test for Significance (two-way ANOVA [F-Test]) (RTS 1) 
 
UV QS df F p-
value13
CWP 9487656,000 2 73,806 0,000* 
ASMGCS 236196,000 1 3,675 0,065 
CWP x ASMGCS 51192,000 2 ,398 0,675 
Error 1928232,000 30   
Total 79567920,000 36   
Table 3-22: R/T Load Test for Significance (two-way ANOVA [F-Test]) (RTS2) 
 
Concluding Results 
The two-way 2x3 ANOVA shows a significant result for A-SMGCS with RTS 1 with a significant 
mean difference of 237 seconds per hour less R/T load (F(1,30) = 12.2, p < .05). With RTS 2, a 162 
second difference between A-SMGCS and baseline was measured, which shows a positive trend to 
                                                     
12 The star with a p-value shows its significance with an α = 0.05. 
13 The star with a p-value shows its significance with an α = 0.05. 
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assume the H1 hypothesis, but became not significant (F(1,30) = 3.6, p > .05). However a p-value of 
0.065 is rather close to significance and with a greater sample size the effect could also be proved.  
With the interpretation of the results, it has to be regarded that with RTS 1 the controllers were very 
much interrupted by evoked conflict situations that did not happen with RTS 2. However, as the 
impact of conflicts is equal to both conditions (A-SMGCS and Baseline) a systematic effect of a 
variance can be excluded.  
OI-EFF4-H0 can be rejected and the alternative H1 can be assumed: A-SMGCS reduces the load of 
R/T communication. 
 
3.3.3 Human Factors 
3.3.3.1 Situation Awareness 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-HF1-H0 The ATCOs’ situational awareness in the Baseline condition is higher or at least 
equal compared to the A-SMGCS Level II test condition. 
OI-HF1-H1 The ATCOs’ situational awareness is improved as an effect of introducing the A-
SMGCS Level II application and the related procedures. 
 
3.3.3.1.1 SASHA Questionnaire Results 
After each test run the controllers’ situation awareness was measured with the SASHA Questionnaire. 
This questionnaire was developed within the project “Solutions for Human-Automation Partnerships 
in European ATM” (SHAPE) conducted by EUROCONTROL (2003)14. The questionnaire uses a five-
point scale and contains 12 questions, of which eight questions address generic subjective aspects of 
SA referring to the work of an ATCO, three questions addressing aspects of specific tools, and one 
question addressing SA globally. Each ATCO completes the questionnaire at the end of a test run. 
These ratings have been merged to two scores per controller, one for the EMMA A-SMGCS and one 
for the baseline condition.  
Following raw data have been measured: 
                                                     
14 http://www.eurocontrol.int/humanfactors/gallery/content/public/docs/DELIVERABLES/HF35-HRS-HSP-005-REP-01withsig.pdf 
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item1 item2 item3 item4 item5 item6 item7 item8 item9 item10 item11 item12 
em1 ba1 em2 ba2 em3 ba3 em4 ba4 em5 ba5 em6 ba6 em7 ba7 em8 ba8 em9 ba9 em10 ba10 em11 ba11 em12 ba12
4,84 4,84 4,67 4,67 4,67 4,67 1,17 1,50 1,50 1,00 1,00 1,50 4,50 3,83 2,17 1,67 4,33 4,00 3,20 n.a. 3,80 n.a. 4,67 4,67
5,00 5,00 4,83 5,00 4,83 5,00 1,17 1,33 1,00 1,50 1,67 1,67 4,83 5,00 2,33 2,50 4,67 4,83 4,33 n.a. 4,33 n.a. 4,67 5,00
4,84 4,66 4,50 4,83 4,50 4,83 1,20 1,00 1,25 1,50 1,17 2,00 4,17 4,50 1,67 1,83 4,67 4,00 3,67 n.a. 4,17 n.a. 4,50 4,50
5,00 4,50 4,83 4,83 4,83 4,83 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,33 4,50 3,67 2,33 2,50 4,67 4,17 3,25 n.a. 2,33 n.a. 4,50 4,00
4,50 4,66 4,83 4,83 4,83 4,83 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,33 1,33 1,00 4,67 4,67 3,67 1,50 5,00 4,33 3,20 n.a. 3,25 n.a. 4,75 4,60
5,00 4,00 5,00 4,33 5,00 4,33 1,33 1,67 1,33 1,33 1,33 2,67 4,33 2,67 2,67 2,67 4,67 3,00 4,33 n.a. 3,67 n.a. 5,00 4,00
5,00 4,33 5,00 4,33 5,00 4,33 1,33 1,33 1,00 2,00 1,67 2,00 3,67 3,67 3,33 2,33 4,33 3,00 3,33 n.a. 3,00 n.a. 4,67 3,33
5,00 5,00 5,00 4,33 5,00 4,00 2,00 1,50 1,33 1,00 2,67 2,00 4,00 3,00 2,33 2,00 3,67 3,00 3,33 n.a. 3,00 n.a. 3,67 3,50
5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 1,00 2,00 1,50 1,33 1,00 2,00 4,00 4,33 2,33 2,67 4,67 5,00 3,00 n.a. 3,00 n.a. 4,67 4,00
5,00 4,33 5,00 4,67 5,00 4,67 1,33 2,67 1,00 1,33 1,00 2,00 4,67 2,67 3,33 3,00 4,33 2,67 4,00 n.a. 4,00 n.a. 4,67 3,33
4,67 5,00 4,67 5,00 4,67 5,00 1,00 1,67 1,33 1,00 1,33 1,33 4,67 4,00 2,33 3,33 5,00 3,00 5,00 n.a. 4,00 n.a. 4,67 4,00
em 
ba 
EMMA A-SMGCS test condition 
Baseline test condition 
Table 3-23: Raw Data SASHA Questionnaire 
 
The following bar charts show the mean values for each of the 12 SASHA questionnaire items. The 
star with a p-value shows the significance of an item, which means the controller commonly saw 
differences between the A-SMGCS and baseline conditions with respect to the assumption of the 
alternative hypothesis (H1).  
 
 
4,66
4,99
1
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Item 1*
Baseline
EMMA A-
SMGCS
       
4,72 4,85
1
2
3
4
5
Item 2
Baseline
EMMA A-
SMGCS
 
        
 
2. Did you have the feeling that you were 
able to plan and organise your work as 
you wanted?  
p = 0.133 
1. Did you have the feeling that you were 
ahead of the traffic, able to predict the 
evolution of the traffic?  
p = 0.04* 
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3,82
4,36
1
2
3
4
5
Item 7
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2,36
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4
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Item 8
Baseline
EMMA A-
SMGCS
 
        
 
 
8. Were you paying too much attention to 
the A-SMGCS / SMR Display? 
 
p = 0.19 
7. Do you think the A-SMGCS / SMR 
Display provided you with useful 
information? 
p = 0.02* 
6. Did you have any difficulty finding an 
item of information? 
p = 0.03* 
5. Did you forget to transfer any aircraft? 
 
p = 0.24 
4. Did you have the feeling of starting to 
focus too much on a single problem 
and/or traffic area under your control? 
p = 0.05 
3. Have you been surprised by an aircraft 
(or vehicle) call that you were not 
expecting? 
p = 0.44 
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Concluding Results 
Six of the 12 questionnaire items have been significantly answered in the expected direction, five 
showed the right trend but without significance, and item 11 was answered in the non-expected 
direction. However, the main situation awareness item 12 has been answered significantly, supporting 
the hypothesis OI-HF1-H1, which expects a higher SA with A-SMGCS use.  
 
With this result, the OI-HF1-H0 can be rejected and the H1 can be assumed as valid alternative that 
means A-SMGCS increases the Controller’s Situation Awareness. 
 
3.3.3.1.2 SASHA on-line Questionnaire Results 
This technique is based on the Situation Present Assessment Method (SPAM). Five ATCOs of the 
RTS 1 were asked three questions by a subject matter expert (SME) via their intercom within each test 
run. This was done while the simulation was still running, i.e. the simulation was not frozen like in the 
classical SAGAT query technique. The following questions were asked: 
 
12. How would you rate your overall 
Situation Awareness during this 
exercise? 
 
p = 0.01* 
11. Did the RWY incursion alert function 
help you to have a better understanding 
of the situation? (only with A-SMGCS test run) 
 
Mean is lower than 3 
10. Do you think the RWY incursion alert 
function provided you with useful 
information? (only with A-SMGCS test run) 
p = 0.00* 
9. Did the A-SMGCS / SMR Display help 
you to have a better understanding of the 
situation? 
p = 0.03* 
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1. Where is flight x? 
2. Is flight y under your control? 
3. Which flight has to be transferred next? 
 
The SA of the ATCOs is usually that high that they do not give wrong answers. The following table 
shows the small cases where they gave wrong answers: 
 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C 
 A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline A-SMGCS Baseline 
 TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC TPC TEC GEC
C1       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
C2       0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C3       0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C4  0 0  1 0  0 0  0 2  0 0  0 0 
C5  0 1  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Total 1 1 1 3 0 1 
Table 3-24: Raw Data of Wrong Answers with the SAHA on-line Query (RTS 1 only) 
 
Concluding Results 
In total 180 (3 times per test run and CWP) questions have been asked to the controllers, but only 7 
wrong answers have been given. Among these 7 wrong answers, 5 have been given when A-SMGCS 
was not used. This result is far from statistically significance but it further supports the hypothesis OI-
HF1-H1, which expects a higher SA with A-SMGCS use. 
 
3.3.3.2 Workload 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-HF3-H0 When workload is on a non-convenient level, the controllers’ workload with the  
A-SMGCS Level II test condition is not lower compared to Baseline test condition. 
OI-HF3-H1 When workload is on a non-convenient level in the baseline condition, the workload 
with use of an A-SMGCS would be reduced with the same scenario. 
 
With every test run every controller was asked to give his perceived workload rating every 10 minutes. 
The controller could choose one of five I.S.A. workload categories:  
1 = underutilised 
2 = relaxed 
3 = comfortable 
4 = high 
5 = excessive 
 
For the analysis, the I.S.A. mid-run workload scores were summed up over each Controller for each 
test run and respective mean scores were calculated (cf. Table 3-25). 
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 A B C 
 A-SMGCS Baseline 
A-
SMGCS Baseline 
A-
SMGCS Baseline 
C1 1,8 2,8 2,6 2,9 2,1 2,2 
C2 2,4 2,8 2,1 2,1 2,4 1,9 
C3 2,0 2,6 2,2 2,0 2,1 2,1 
C4 2,9 2,9 3,1 3,4 2,6 2,3 
C5 3,2 2,7 2,7 3,0 2,5 2,7 
C6 2,4 2,2 2,0 2,2 2,2 2,2 
C7 2,6 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 1,6 
C8 3,2 2,0 2,0 2,4 2,2 2,0 
C9 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 
C10 1,8 2,2 2,0 2,0 2,0 2,0 
C11 2,2 2,0 1,8 2,0 2,0 2,2 
Total 2,41 2,38 2,23 2,36 2,19 2,11 
Table 3-25: Mean Values of I.S.A. Workload 
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Figure 3-6: Total Means for I.S.A.15 Workload between A-SMGCS and Baseline Test Conditions 
 
Factors df F-value p-value 
A-SMGCS 1 0,019 0,89 
error 10   
Traffic scenario 2 4,540 0,02* 
error 20   
asmgcs * scenario 2 0,869 0,44 
error 20   
Table 3-26: ANOVA with Repeated Measurements for I.S.A. Workload 
 
The means from Table 3-25 were analysed in separate 2 x 3 (A-SMGCS x Scenario) analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) with repeated measurements on all independent factors. The ANOVA revealed no 
significant main effect of A-SMGCS (F(1,10) = 0,019; p = 0.89) with a mean of M = 2,285 compared to 
the baseline mean of M = 2,276 on a scale reaching from 1-5. A significant main effect for the traffic 
scenario was found (F(2,20) = 4,540; p = 0.02), whereas traffic scenario C reaches the smallest workload 
                                                     
15 “Instantaneous Self Assessment” workload scale is a mid-run assessment tool with five dimensions ranging from “underutilised” through 
“excessive”. 
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mean (MA = 2,40; MB = 2,30; and MC = 2,15), where the visibility is the lowest but also the traffic 
amount is only the half of scenario A or B.  
 
Concluding Results 
Most of the time the controllers felt relaxed and comfortable in the simulation runs, independent of the 
test condition A-SMGCS or Baseline. Traffic scenarios were not demanding enough to stress the 
controllers. Therefore, A-SMGCS had no chance to show a workload improvement compared to a 
high or even excessive workload in the baseline condition. 
Since a “non-convenient workload level” as stated by OI-HF3-H0 could not be reached, A-SMGCS 
could not show its benefits in terms of workload reduction. Therefore, OI-HF3-H0 cannot be rejected 
with the used experimental design. 
 
3.4 Departure Manager (DMAN) Demonstration Results 
During the second EMMA RTS phase in the Tower Simulator in Braunschweig, the DMAN was 
demonstrated to the two controller teams from the Prague Tower, who participated in the RTS trials. 
For each team, consisting of three controllers, one day had been allocated, with the possibility to run 
different simulation scenarios several times and with different controllers at the working positions. 
The goals of the simulation exercises were mainly to show the technical feasibility of departure 
planning, to make the controllers familiar with using a planning tool and to demonstrate what 
information can be provided to the controller concerning the anticipated ground traffic operations.  
At the present state of development, it was not intended to perform tests concerning the operational 
usability of the DMAN or possible operational improvements, since there was a technical HMI to be 
used, and the controllers had no training in operating the DMAN.  
3.4.1 Course of the Demonstration 
For both demonstration days, the following schedule had been arranged: 
• Briefing  
• Familiarisation with the DMAN in the small technical scenario EMMA_T1, optionally to be 
repeated  
• Demonstration of the DMAN in the complex operational scenario EMMA_A1  
• Debriefing  
• Break  
• Second demonstration of the DMAN in the complex operational scenario EMMA_A1  
• Final debriefing  
For all simulation runs, the following human roles at the working positions had been scheduled: 
• TEC: 1 Prague controller and 1 DLR assistant for explanations and support in 
  operating the DMAN HMI.  
• CEC + GND: 1 Prague controller and 1 DLR assistant for explanations and support in 
  operating the DMAN HMI.  
• E2000: 1 Prague controller as an observer 
The aircraft in the simulation were again individually controlled by DLR pseudo-pilots, using R/T 
voice communication between pilots and controllers.  
The simulation exercises were managed by a DLR supervisor and a DMAN specialist.  
Both days the session started with a briefing, where a presentation on the DMAN was given to the 
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controllers, and the intentions and the course of the simulation exercises were explained. In the 
subsequent discussion, the controllers expressed concerns with respect to additional workload possibly 
caused be the use of a planning tool.  
The simulation exercises started with the small technical scenario EMMA_T1 for familiarization. 
First, the HMIs were explained in detail by the assistants. During the simulation run, the controllers 
managed the traffic and observed the DMAN, and the assistants performed the clearance and hand-
over entries at the DMAN, and gave explanations. Very soon, some of the controllers started to make 
the entries by themselves, and also to check, how diverse flight plan items could be changed. It had to 
be explained that arbitrary changing vital flight plan data would disturb the planning process, which in 
one case led to repeating the scenario. Nevertheless, it was useful to show the diverse capabilities of 
the DMAN HMIs, and how diverse flight plan items can be adjusted in accordance to the controller’s 
intentions. 
The complex operational scenario EMMA_A1 was performed twice and the controllers changed the 
working positions at each run. In the beginning, the assistants had to support the operation of the 
DMAN, but the more the controllers got used to it, the more they operated the DMAN by themselves. 
The controllers observed closely the information provided by the DMAN displays, and how the 
planning results performed. With progress of the simulation exercise, they handled more sophisticated 
procedures like changes of the assigned runway and intersection take-offs. 
3.4.2 Results  
There were two sources during the DMAN trials to gain the qualitative/subjective results: 
• Observations made during the simulation runs.  
• Comments made by the controllers during the briefings, simulation runs and debriefings.  
For each category a short summary shall be given. 
Observations: 
• During all simulation runs the DMAN performed well. The planning results were timely and 
in accordance with the respective traffic situation, even when flight plan data had been 
manually changed by the controllers due to changed procedures.  
• The simulation scenarios were well-suited for the demonstration purposes. The small technical 
scenario with its low traffic density gives enough time for the assistants to explain how the 
DMAN HMIs have to be operated, and allows the controllers to familiarise themselves with 
the information provided at the displays and the required entries, without being under pressure 
by managing a complex traffic scenario. The complex operational scenario has been evaluated 
and approved throughout the first EMMA RTS phase, and provides a traffic flow and traffic 
operations to which the controllers are used from their daily work in Prague.  
• The simulation runs went smoothly, with the traffic professionally managed by the controllers, 
and by the pseudo-pilots.  
• The controllers soon became acquainted with the DMAN displays, and correlated the actual 
and upcoming traffic situation with the information provided by the flight strips generally 
well.  
• Though the controllers had to operate the DMAN via technical HMIs, which are not meant for 
operational use, they were relatively soon able to perform clearance and handover entries by 
themselves, without being distracted too much from managing the traffic.  
• The controllers were generally interested in the information provided by a planning tool, and 
tried to check out the capabilities of the DMAN. They handled intersection take-offs with 
change of runway entry point and also changes of the assigned runway.  
 
Comments by the Controllers: 
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Most of the comments given by the controllers were related to the HMI subject and the resulting 
workload, though it was made clear beforehand, that the presented technical HMI is not intended for 
operational use in the tower.  
The respective concerns of the controllers will be taken into account in EMMA2, when as planned an 
integrated A-SMGCS HMI comprising DMAN HMI functionality will be developed.  
• The present HMIs require too much head-down time.  
• Traffic control, coordination with other authorities at the airport and additionally operating the 
DMAN will overload the controller. 
• An A-SMGCS display together with a separate DMAN display is no suitable solution, since 
the controller has to look out of the tower windows and also to check two displays and operate 
the system. This leads to too much head-down time, increases the workload and distracts the 
controller from his primary task.  
• The solution should be an integrated A-SMGCS display, where the traffic information 
together with the planning information is shown.  
• The information given by the planning function should be reduced to the amount really 
necessary for the controller. 
• Entries at the HMI require too many mouse clicks at different locations in the display. For 
instance, the confirm button could be replaced by a double-click.  
• The number of required HMI entries should be reduced by more automation. 
• The HMI column, which notes the next clearance, is misleading, since controllers are used to 
note given clearances. 
• Entries at the DMAN, which change flight plan data, must feed back to other systems; e.g. 
information also shown in the labels on the traffic situation display must change in 
accordance. 
• Several times it was stated, that apart from the HMI issues the DMAN works well and stable, 
ant that the planning function provides reasonable results.  
 
Altogether it was acknowledged, that with an integrated, easy to handle A-SMGCS HMI the DMAN 
would be a valuable tool. 
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4 Operational Field Trials Results 
4.1 Introduction 
Operational Field trials in the operational Tower at Prague Ruzyne Airport were conducted on the 3rd 
of November 2005, 16th through 18th and 23rd through 25th of January 2006. 
The operational field trial exercises used the A-SMGCS test-bed components at Prague-Ruzyne 
airport, established under SP3 of the EMMA Project, and the commercial A-SMGCS that was already 
used fully operationally from mid of 2005. The Validation Platform is described in the EMMA Prague 
Test Plan [13]. 
4.2 Operational Feasibility (Field Trials) 
The operational feasibility tests aim at assessing the user’s acceptance of the EMMA ORD [10] 
operational procedures and requirements. It was expected that the operational feasibility of the system 
would be confirmed, for each set of visibility conditions, using defined procedures derived from 
EMMA Operational Requirements Document (ORD). The following general hypothesis has been used 
to decide upon the test results: 
 
High-level 
Objective 1 
EMMA A-SMGCS shows the operational feasibility of the operational procedures and 
requirements expressed in the initial EMMA ORD [10] for each set of conditions. 
 
To prove the operational feasibility of the installed A-SMGCS three main exercises were conducted: 
1. Debriefing Questionnaires and Interviews 
2. Long Term Alert Performance Assessment 
3. Flight Tests with test aircraft and test vehicles 
The following sections give details and results to each exercise. 
4.2.1 Debriefing Questionnaire (operational feasibility) 
A total of 15 ANS-CR controllers filled out the debriefing questionnaire during the EMMA 
operational field trials. All 15 ANS_CR had worked with the A-SMGCS for 7 months at the time of 
the investigation. The table below shows the distribution of age, gender, and ATC experiences: 
 
 Category N 
Age 20-29 2
 30-39 8
 40-49 3
 >50 2
Gender  male 12
 female 3
ATCO Experience (years) <5 3
 6-10 3
 11-15 7
 16-20 0
 21-25 1
 > 26 1
Table 4-1: Social-Demographic Data of the Sample Size 
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A 144 item debriefing questionnaire were given to 15 ANS_CR controllers after their regular shift. 
The items that refer to the“operational feasibility” questions/statements loaded to five areas:  
• General usability,  
• Surveillance service,  
• Control service,  
• HMI design, and  
• New or potential procedures.  
 
The following general hypothesis was set up to describe the expectation with the controllers’ answers: 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OF-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “operational feasibility” aspects of a 
specific item. 
OF-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “operational feasibility” aspects of a specific 
item. 
 
Ratings to a statement could be given from 1 (strongly disagree) up to 6 (strongly agree). The 
following table shows the raw data of the complete Debriefing Questionnaire (including operational 
improvement items). The VA-Id. number identifies the items, C1 through C15 identifies the index of 
the 15 ANS_CR controllers, a bold number shows that a comment has been given, and a star (*) 
indicates that a comment was given but without a rating. 
 
VA-
Id. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
1 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 
2 5 5 5 6 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 3 3 5 4 
3 5 5 5 6 6 5 6 6 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 
4 1 4 2 2 3 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 3 5 3 
5 2 5 1 2 3 3 5 3 3 5 5 3 * 5 3 
6 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 3 5 2 
7 5 4 2 5 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 3 4 4 4 
8 4 4 2 4 4 5 5 5 4 6 5 4 4 5 4 
9 5 5 6 5 1 6 6 6 6 6 5 5 6 5 5 
10 5 5 6 4 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 
11 5 5 6 5 6 2 6 5 6 6 4 5 4 5 5 
12 5 5 6 6 5 5 6 5 6 6 5 6 5 5 5 
13 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 6 
14 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 6 4 2 
15 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 * 5 5 4 5 6 5 2 
16 5 5 6 5 6 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 
17 5 4 6 5 6 4 5 5 2 6 3 5 2 5 5 
18 4 3 2 5 3 4 4 5 3 2  3  4 * 
19 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5  3 4 5 * 
20 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 3 3 2 3 1 
21 4 5 2 4 2 4 6 5 3 4 4 4 2 5 4 
22 3 4 4 5 4 4 6 5 5 6 5 5 5 4 6 
23 5 4 5 5 6 6 6 5 6 6 5 5 6 5 6 
24 3 4 4 4 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 4 6 
25 5 5 6 6 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 2 
26 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 5 6 6 5 5 5 6 3 
27 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 
28 5 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 6 5 6 5 
29 5 5 6 6 4 4 5 5 6 6 4 5 6 6 5 
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VA-
Id. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
30 2 3 2 2 2 3 * 1 2 4 2 4 4 6 2 
31 2 3 2 2 2 3 * 1 3 4 2 4 4 5 2 
32 2 3 2 2 2 3 * 1 4 5 2 4 5 5 2 
33 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 2 5 4 
34 5 4 5 4 3 5 4 4 3 5 4 3 4 5 3 
35 2 4 5 5 5 4 3 2 2 5 5 4 2 5 4 
36 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 3 5 6 5 5 
37 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 3 5 5 5 4 
38 5 3 6 5 4 4 4 5 6 6 1 6 5 5 5 
39 3 3 4 5 2 4 5 5 1 5 4 3 4 4 5 
40 3 4 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 5 2 4 6 4 2 
41 3 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 2 5 4 5 5 6 5 
42 3 4 6  2 * 5 * 5 6  5  6 4 
43 5 5 6 4 4 5 5 5 3 6 5 5 5 5 5 
44 3 5 5 6 2 5 6 5 4 5 5 1 5 5 5 
45 4 5 5 6 2 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 6 5 5 
46 5 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 
47 4 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 3 6 5 5 6 6 5 
48 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 6 5 5 
49 1 5 6 5 1 5 1 3 5 5 4 5 6 4 4 
50 5 5 6 5 1 5 5 4 5 6 5 6 6 6 5 
51 5 4 6 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 4 4  6 4 
52 4 4 6 5 2 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 6 6 4 
53 5 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 6 5 4 6 5 5 
54 3 5 3 5 2 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 6 6 2 
55 5 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 6 6 5 
56 2 5 6 5 1 4 1 5 4 5 3 5 5 5 4 
57 2 5 6 5 2 4 1 5 5 6 3 4 5 5 4 
58 5 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 3 6 5 3 6 5 5 
59 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 4 5 6 6 5 
60 2 3 4  1 2 1 2 2 2  3  3 2 
61 6 5 5 * * 5 5 5 4 5 2 5 6 6 5 
62 6 5 5  * 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 6 6 5 
63 5 4 4  6 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 4 5 5 
63a           5 5 5 6 5 
64  3 4  * * * * 3 2  * 2 5 2 
65  2 4  *  * * 3 6  * 2 3 4 
66  4 4  *  * * 4 2  * 6 5 4 
67  4 4  *  * * 4 5 2 * 6 6 4 
68  3 4  *  * 2 2 4  * 3 3 4 
69  4 5  *  * 2 3 2  * 1 4 2 
70 5 5 3  5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 
71 2 3 4  4 5 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 
72 3 5 6 5 6 5 6 5 5 6 4 5 6 5 5 
73 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
74 5 4 5 4 1 2 5 4 2 6 3 4 6 4 3 
75 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 6 5 5 6 6 5 
76 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 
77 5 4 5 4 2 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 6 5 3 
78 5 4 5 5 6 5 6 5 5 6 5 6 6 5 5 
79 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 6 5 5 6 6 3 
80 5 4 5 5 6 5 5 5 4 6 6 5 5 5 4 
81 4 3 4 5 2 4 5 3 4 4 4 4 3 5 2 
82 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 6 5 
83 2 3 4 2 5 3 5 * 3 2 * 4 5 5 4 
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VA-
Id. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
84 5 4 5 4 6 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 
85 5 3 3 4 4 3 2 2 3 2 3 1 2 5 2 
86 5 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 6 5 6 
87 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 2 4 1 4 5 2 
88 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 6 4 5 3 5 5 
89 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 
90 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 5 1 2 2 
91 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 
92 2 3 4 4 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 3 3 
93 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 
94 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 6 5 5 4 5 4 
95 5 4 6 4 4 5 6 5 6 6 6 5 6 2 5 
96 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 
97 5 4 5 3 1 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 
98 5 4 5 4 6 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 6 6 5 
99 5 4 5 4 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 
100 5 4 5 4 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 6 6 5 
101 5 2 5 3 6 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 3 5 5 
102 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 5 6 6 5 5 
103 5 4 4 4 3 5 3 5 5 4 5 6 6 6 5 
104 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 3 2 4 3 2 
105 2 2 2 5 1 2 5 2 2 2 5 4 2 2 2 
106 5 4 5 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 
107 5 4 5 4 6 4 5 5 3 5 2 5 1 5 2 
108 5 4 5 5 6 4 5 5 3 5 4 5  5 4 
109 3 4 4 4 4 2 2 4 6 3 2 3 4 3 5 
110 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 6 5 5 
111 4 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 2 6 4 
112 5 5 5 5 2 5 5 5 6 6 4 5 6 5 4 
113 5 5 5 6 1 5 5 5 4 6 5 5 6 6 5 
114 5 5 5 6 1 * 4 5 4 6 5 5 5 6 5 
115 5 5 5 6 1 * * 5 4 6 5 5 5 6 5 
116 5 4 5 4 1 4 4 5 5 6 5 4 5 5 5 
117 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 4 5 6 3 
118 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 5 5 5  4 
119 2 2 2 4 2 3 2 2 4 4  * 4 5 4 
120 5 2 3 2 1 2 1 2 2 1      
121 5 2 3 4  3 5 5 4 5      
121a           2 2 5 5 3 
122 5 2 2 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 
123 6 2 2 5 2 5 5 5 5 6 4 5 6 5 3 
124 5 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 4 5 5 5 4 
125 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 5 6 5 
126 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 4 
127 5 2 3 5 5 5 4 5 4 6 4 5 5 4 4 
128 2 4 3 4 2 4 2 5 2 5 3  5 5 2 
129 3 2 3 3 1 4 3 2 3 5      
130 3 2 5 3 1 3 4 2 3 2 2 2 1 3 4 
131           5 5 6 5 4 
131 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 5 
132 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 4 3 
133 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 2 3 4 2 3 2 3 2 
134 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 
135 5 5 5 5 * 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 2 
136 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 6 4 5 5 6 5 
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VA-
Id. C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15
137 5 4 5  5 5 5 * 4 5 4 5  5 3 
138 2 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2  4 2 
139 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 6 4 5 5 4 5 
140 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 6 3 5 3 5 5 
141 5 5 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 6 3 5 3 5 5 
142 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 5 5 2 
143 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 
144 5 4 3 4 5 4 * 5 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 
Table 4-2: Debriefing Questionnaire Raw Data (Field Trials) 
A one-sample t-test has been applied to prove the data for their statistical significance for all 144items.  
• One-Sample T-Test 
• Expected mean value = 3,5 
• Answers from 1 (disagreement) through 6 (agreement) 
• N = 15 
• α = 0.05 
• p-value is single-sided because of the use of a directed hypothesis 
 
Results referring the “operational feasibility” items are reported with sections 4.2.1.1 “General”, 
4.2.1.2 “Surveillance”, 4.2.1.3 “Control”, 4.2.1.4 “HMI”, and 4.2.1.5 “Procedures”. Results to the 
“operational improvement” items can be found in section 4.3.1. 
A star (*) with the p-value means that a item has been answered significantly because the p-value is 
equal or less than the critical error probability α, which is 0.05. Additionally, such items are coloured 
green. 
When the controllers significantly express their acceptance to a single service or procedure item, it can 
be assumed that the operational feasibility is proven for this area of interest. 
Items written in italics could not be answered meaningfully because the controllers had limited or no 
operational experience with the topic (e.g. except in the case of lit stop bar crossing, no system alerts 
have been used operationally by the ATCOs). When controller comments were given to an item, they 
are reported directly below the statement.  
In addition to that, the sources of each item are reported. Sources are requirements or procedures 
reported in the ORD [10] and TRD [17]. 
 
4.2.1.1 General 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item N Mean SD p 
78 I used the A-SMGCS frequently.  15 5,3 0,6 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: During LVP operated 
80 The A-SMGCS is highly relevant for my work. 15 5,0 0,7 0,00*
82 I feel very confident using the A-SMGCS. 15 4,9 0,6 0,00*
85 Under visibility 1 / good visibility conditions A-SMGCS provides no 
additional information.  
15 2,9 1,2 0,08 
 Comment by ATCO C: … but I still use it. 
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86 It is helpful to use A-SMGCS when visual reference is impaired 15 5,1 0,8 0,00*
87 I find the A-SMGCS unnecessarily complex.  15 2,4 1,1 0,00*
95 The A-SMGCS display gives me information which I missed before. 15 5,0 1,1 0,00*
117 I experienced the level of safety by using the A-SMGCS as very high. 15 4,9 0,7 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO O: Slightly disagree. I am especially referring to the indication of blocked RWY. The mouse is 
not always at hand’s reach and, especially in busy hours, it is difficult to operate this function. It’s happened often 
that we executed DEP/ARR without switching off the indication. 
135 The A-SMGCS display makes it easier to detect potentially problematic 
situations. 
14 5,0 1,0 0,00*
140 It is easy to learn to work with A-SMGCS. 15 4,9 0,8 0,00*
141 I would imagine that most operational personnel would learn to use A-
SMGCS very quickly. 
15 4,9 0,8 0,00*
142 I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going with the A-
SMGCS. 
15 2,5 1,1 0,00*
143 There was enough training on the display, its rules, and its mechanisms. 15 4,6 0,6 0,00*
144 There was enough training on how to control traffic with the use of the 
A-SMGCS.  
14 4,4 1,2 0,02*
 Comment by ATCO C: It was really easy for me; I needn’t any special training on. 
Comment by ATCO G: There was none, do we need any? 
Table 4-3: Debriefing Questionnaire – Means, SD, and P-Value for “General” operational feasibility items 
 
4.2.1.2 Surveillance 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item ORD / HMI TRD N Mean SD p 
1 When visual reference is not 
possible, the displayed position of the 
aircraft in the runway sensitive area 
is accurate enough to exercise control 
in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
15 5,1 0,5 0,00*
2 When visual reference is not 
possible, the displayed position of 
vehicles in the runway sensitive area 
is accurate enough to exercise control 
in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
15 4,7 0,9 0,00*
3 When visual reference is not 
possible, the displayed position of the 
aircraft on the taxiways is accurate 
enough to exercise control in a safe 
and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
15 5,4 0,5 0,00*
4 When visual reference is not 
possible, a missing label is not a 
problem to exercise control in a safe 
and efficient way. 
OP_Serv-04  
OP_Perf-12 
OP_Perf-11 
 
Tech_Gen_28 
Tech_Surv_03
15 2,9 1,1 0,07 
5 When visual reference is not OP_Serv-11 Tech_Gen_28 14 3,4 1,3 0,85 
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VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item ORD / HMI TRD N Mean SD p 
possible, a missing position report is 
not a problem to exercise control in a 
safe and efficient way. 
OP_Serv-04  
OP_Perf-12 
OP_Perf-11 
Tech_Surv_03
 Comment by ATCO M: hasn’t happened. 
6 When visual reference is not 
possible, a wrong label is not a 
problem to exercise control in a safe 
and efficient way. 
OP_Serv-04 
OP_Perf-11 
 
Tech_Surv_03 15 1,9 1,1 0,00*
7 Very frequently I experienced track 
swapping. 
 Tech_Gen_28 15 3,4 1,2 0,75 
8 When visual reference is not 
possible, track swapping prevents me 
to exercise control in a safe and 
efficient way. 
OP_Perf-11 
OP_Perf-13 
OP_Perf-11 
 
Tech_Gen_31 
Tech_Gen_35 
Tech_Gen_36 
15 4,3 0,9 0,00*
15 I think manual labelling is useful. HMI_REQ 3.1.1
 #6 + #19 
Tech_HMI_07 14 4,5 1,0 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO H: I haven’t used it yet. 
Comment by ATCO O: It takes some time and label is often lost. 
16 I think that the A-SMGCS 
surveillance display could be used to 
determine that an aircraft has vacated 
the runway. 
OP_Serv-11 Tech_Supp_03 
 
15 5,3 0,5 0,00*
17 I think that the A-SMGCS 
surveillance display could be used to 
determine that an aircraft has crossed 
a holding position. 
OP_Serv-11 Tech_Supp_03 
 
15 4,5 1,3 0,01*
 Comment by ATCO F: The holding position is much more accurate (???) position then vacating RWY therefore I 
slightly agree. 
35 I think that the A-SMGCS 
surveillance display could be used to 
determine that an aircraft is on stand 
or has left the stand. 
OP_Perf-05 
OP_Serv-11 
Tech_Surv_26 
 
15 3,8 1,3 0,37 
 Comment by ATCO F: it depends on quality of surveillance 
Comment by ATCO O: During LVO yes. Otherwise, I still prefer to look out of the window. 
89 I think there is too much 
inconsistency between A-SMGCS 
and real traffic. 
OP_Serv-01 
OP_Serv-03 
Tech_Surv_34 15 2,5 1,0 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO K: But sometimes false targets. 
111 The A-SMGCS display gives me 
sufficient information about airborne 
traffic in the vicinity of the airport. 
OP_Perf-07 
OP_Serv-13 
Tech_Surv_32 
Tech_Surv_20
15 4,5 1,0 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: I rely more on E 2000. 
Table 4-4: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Surveillance” operational feasibility 
items 
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4.2.1.3 Control 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item ORD TRD N Mean SD p 
25 A-SMGCS helps to issue traffic 
information. 
 Tech_Surv_05 
Tech_Gen_02 
15 5,1 1,0 0,00*
26 A-SMGCS makes it easier to detect pilot 
errors. 
 Tech_Surv_05 
 
15 5,2 0,8 0,00*
27 When visual reference is not possible, A-
SMGCS facilitates to give traffic 
information to pilots so that they can 
avoid other traffic. 
OP_Perf-5 
 
Tech_Surv_26 
Tech_Gen_02 
15 4,9 0,5 0,00*
40 A-SMGCS display gives me better means 
to expedite or slow down an aircraft’s taxi 
speed. 
 Tech_Surv_28 15 4,1 1,2 0,06 
 Comment by ATCO D: I don’t do it very often without (with) A-SMGCS. 
64 Information alerts are often popping up 
too late to solve the situation before an 
alarm comes up. 
 Tech_Cont_13 
 
7 3,0 1,2 0,30 
 Comment by ATCO L: In test – not used in real traffic. 
65 Too many unnecessary information alerts 
were popping up. 
Op_Perf-20 Tech_Cont_08 
Tech_HMI_15
7 3,4 1,4 0,90 
 Comment by ATCO L: In test – not used in real traffic. 
Comment by ATCO O: in case of false targets. 
66 I think that all Runway Incursion Alerts 
are triggered at the right moment. 
Op_Perf-20 Tech_Cont_13 7 4,1 1,2 0,21 
 Comment by ATCO L: In test – not used in real traffic. 
67 I think that a Runway Incursion 
monitoring alert function helps me to 
react in an expeditious and safe manner. 
OP_Serv-16 Tech_Cont_13 
Tech_Cont_03 
8 4,4 1,3 0,10 
 Comment by ATCO K: The problem is that A-SMGCS display is not the ATCO’s primary display. 
Comment by ATCO L: In test – not used in real traffic. 
68 I experienced too many false alerts to 
work in a safe and efficient way. 
OP_Perf-20
OP_Perf-21
Tech_Cont_12 
 
8 3,1 0,8 0,24 
 Comment by ATCO L: In test – not used in real traffic. 
69 There were cases where an alarm was 
missing. 
 Tech_Cont_02 
 
8 2,9 1,4 0,23 
 Comment by ATCO L: In test – not used in real traffic. 
77 Issuing clearances to aircraft is supported 
well by the A-SMGCS. 
OP_Serv-14 Tech_Gen_02  15 4,5 1,0 0,00*
79 The information displayed in the A-
SMGCS is helpful for avoiding conflicts. 
OP_Serv-21
OP_Serv-30
OP_DS-6 
Tech_Surv_05 15 5,1 0,7 0,00*
123 The A-SMGCS enables me to provide the OP_Serv-14 Tech_Gen_02  15 4,4 1,5 0,03*
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VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item ORD TRD N Mean SD p 
pilots a better level of service. 
 Comment by ATCO E: Not in normal condition. Within LVP traffic information are given. 
Table 4-5: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Control” operational feasibility items 
 
4.2.1.4 HMI 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item 
D135_ORD 
D136_HMI N Mean SD p 
75 The A-SMGCS provides the right information at the 
right time. 
Op_Serv-30 15 5,1 0,6 0,00*
81 Improvements in the A-SMGCS display would be 
desirable. 
 15 3,7 1,0 0,36 
83 The display enables to recognize a degrading accuracy 
of surveillance. 
 13 3,6 1,2 0,73 
84 The display layout is easy to customize to my own 
preferences.  
REQ 3.1.1 #2 
+ 
#18 
15 4,7 0,7 0,00*
88 I think the A-SMGCS is easy to use. Op_If-1 15 4,9 0,7 0,00*
90 I find the A-SMGCS very difficult to use.  Op_If-1 15 1,9 1,0 0,00*
91 The use of the different windows on the A-SMGCS 
display is clear to me. 
Op_If-1 15 4,8 0,6 0,00*
92 Too much interaction with the A-SMGCS is needed. Op_If-1 15 2,9 0,8 0,01*
93 The A-SMGCS display is easy to understand. Op_If-1 15 5,0 0,4 0,00*
94 The A-SMGCS display provides an active, involved 
role for me. 
Op_If-1 15 4,7 0,6 0,00*
96 Information is conveniently arranged in the A-SMGCS 
display.  
Op_If-1 15 4,7 0,5 0,00*
97 The amount of information in the A-SMGCS display is 
not too large. 
Op_If-1 15 4,4 1,2 0,01*
98 Symbols can easily be read under different angles of 
view in the A-SMGCS display. 
Op_If-1 15 5,1 0,6 0,00*
99 Labels, signs, and symbols in the A-SMGCS display 
are easy to interpret. 
REQ 3.1.1 
#15 + 
#16 + #17 
REQ 3.2.4# 4 
Op_If-1 
15 5,0 0,5 0,00*
100 The height and width of characters in the A-SMGCS 
display is sufficient. 
Op_If-1 15 5,0 0,7 0,00*
101 The A-SMGCS display layout in general should not be 
changed. 
Op_If-1 15 4,5 1,1 0,00*
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VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item 
D135_ORD 
D136_HMI N Mean SD p 
102 The A-SMGCS display size is appropriate for daily 
work. 
Op_If-1 15 5,1 0,5 0,00*
103 All text in the display is easy to read. Op_If-1 15 4,7 1,0 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: ARR + DEP windows are difficult to read (not often used in real traffic). 
Comment by ATCO G: When yellow (?) alert is on the colour of box and text inside the box is not very well 
combined, 
104 There is too much information in the A-SMGCS 
display which is not needed. 
Op_If-1 15 2,5 0,7 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: Can be set up at personal feelings. 
105 Some relevant information is frequently missing in the 
A-SMGCS display. 
Op_If-1 15 2,7 1,3 0,03*
 Comment by ATCO D: Labels on the end of screen. 
Comment by ATCO G: Designation of temporary maps window, when you open the window you don’t know 
which of the maps is used. 
Comment by ATCO K: Departing aircraft in DEP window 
Comment by ATCO L: Some missing aircraft in departure list while aircraft is ready to go -> manual labelling 
impossible. 
106 The display colours chosen in the A-SMGCS display 
are appropriate. 
REQ 3.1.1#13 
Op_If-1 
15 4,9 0,5 0,00*
107 Pop-up windows appear at the expected place and size. Op_If-1 15 4,1 1,4 0,15 
 Comment by ATCO K: Pop-up window referring to time to threshold is not visible in certain situations (THD (?) is 
close to window edge). 
Comment by ATCO O: When RWY 13 is in use (not often) -> when a pop-up window (arrival) appears, it hides a 
label of departure that holds short of RWY 13 on RWY 24. It is necessary to open secondary window to get the 
information. 
108 The windows on the A-SMGCS display are 
conveniently arranged. 
Op_If-1 14 4,6 0,7 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO O: (except for the pop-up window of arrival on RWY 13 – see item 107) 
109 Aircraft that should have been visible are sometimes 
obscured by pop-up windows. 
REQ 3.1.1 
#14 
15 3,5 1,1 0,91 
 Comment by ATCO O: (except for the pop-up window of arrival on RWY 13 – see item 107) 
110 The contrast between the windows and their 
background is sufficient. 
 15 5,0 0,4 0,00*
130 The A-SMGCS display is detracting too much 
attention. 
Op_If-1 15 2,7 1,1 0,01*
 Comment by ATCO O: not the display itself; it is sometimes forgotten to operate the function of blocked RWY, 
especially in heavy traffic (we are used to a different indication) and it can lead to a situation when reality is 
different from what is indicated on display. 
131 The A-SMGCS display helps to have a better 
understanding of the situation. 
REQ 3.1.1 #9 
+ 
 #15 
5 5,0 0,7 0,01*
132 Important events on the A-SMGCS were difficult to 
recognize. 
REQ 3.1.1 
 #13 + #14 + 
 #17 + #23 + 
#27 
Op_If-1 
15 2,3 0,6 0,00*
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VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item 
D135_ORD 
D136_HMI N Mean SD p 
133 Sometimes information is display, which I don't need. REQ 3.1.1 
#12 +  
#14 + #15 ? 
Op_If-1 
15 3,1 0,8 0,05 
134 Different colour codes on the A-SMGCS display are 
easy to interpret. 
(REQ 3.1.1 
#13) 
Op_If-1 
15 5,0 0,4 0,00*
Table 4-6: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “HMI” operational feasibility items 
4.2.1.5 Procedures 
 
VA-
Id. Procedure 
ORD  
sections N Mean SD p 
18 Contingency A-SMGCS surveillance identification 
procedures 
I think when the SMR completely fails but MLAT remains 
the A-SMGCS display cannot be used as a primary means 
for identification anymore. 
4.2.2 12 3,5 1,0 1,00 
 Comment by ATCO F: Depends on how many aircraft and vehicles are equipped with transponder. 
Comment by ATCO O: I have no experience with that 
19 When the direct recognition of aircraft/vehicle IDs through 
the label is no longer possible, due to a ground MLAT 
failure, the surveillance display should be downgraded to a 
lower level of surveillance, such as SMGCS surveillance 
display (e.g. labelled SMR) or SMR display only. 
4.2.2 13 4,4 0,7 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO O: I have no experience with that 
20 I think an individual aircraft’s failure to comply with A-
SMGCS procedures (e.g. MODE-S transponder failure) 
requires returning completely to SMGCS procedures for all 
aircraft. 
4.2.2 15 2,8 1,4 0,07 
21 I think procedures in case of A-SMGCS failure are defined 
clear enough. 
4.2.2 15 3,9 1,2 0,25 
22 Transponder Operating Procedures 
I experienced that aircraft have failed to comply with the 
transponder operating procedures. 
5. 15 4,7 0,9 0,00*
23 I think it is appropriate that pilots switch on the 
transponder before requesting pushback (or taxiing or 
whatever is earlier). 
5.2.2 15 5,4 0,6 0,00*
24 I experienced that pilots have failed to turn the transponder 
on just prior to requesting push back (or taxiing or 
whatever is earlier). 
5.2.2 15 4,7 0,9 0,00*
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30 Start-Up clearance delivery 
The A-SMGCS surveillance display enables me to 
establish a more efficient start-up sequence in visibility 1 
conditions. 
8.1.2 
 
14 2,8 1,3 0,06 
 Comment by ATCO G: There is no such description in the system. 
31 The A-SMGCS surveillance display enables me to 
establish a more efficient start-up sequence in visibility 2 
conditions. 
8.1.2 
 
14 2,8 1,1 0,03*
 Comment by ATCO G: There is no such description in the system.      
32 The A-SMGCS surveillance display enables me to 
establish a more efficient start-up sequence in visibility 3 
conditions. 
8.1.2 
 
14 3,0 1,4 0,19 
 Comment by ATCO G: There is no such description in the system. 
33 Push-back clearances 
When gates are not visible push-back clearances based on 
A-SMGCS traffic information can be given in a safe way.  
8.1.3.2 15 4,2 0,8 0,00*
34 I think that traffic information on the A-SMGCS 
surveillance display helps me to decide whether a push-
back clearance should be delayed.  
8.1.3 15 4,1 0,8 0,02*
36 Taxi clearances 
I can rely on A-SMGCS when giving taxi clearances even 
when visual reference is not possible. 
8.1.4.2 15 4,9 0,7 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO K: slightly disagree due to false targets 
37 Longitudinal spacing on taxiways is easier to survey with 
A-SMGCS even when visual reference is not possible. 
 15 4,9 0,6 0,00*
38 When visual reference is not possible I think longitudinal 
spacing on taxiways can be reduced with A-SMGCS. 
 15 4,7 1,3 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO L: … if approved by our authority, it would be great. 
44 Taxiing on the runway 
ICAO doc 4444 states that for the purpose of expediting air 
traffic, aircraft may be permitted to taxi on the runway-in-
use. I think the use of A-SMGCS could allow this even 
when visual reference is not possible. 
8.1.7.2 15 4,5 1,4 0,02*
48 Line-up procedures 
When an intersection is not visible, line-up from this 
intersection could be applied in a safe way when using A-
SMGCS. 
8.1.8.2.2 15 5,1 0,5 0,00*
49 I think it could practicable to make multiple line-ups using 
A-SMGCS when visual reference is not possible. 
8.1.8.3.1.2 15 4,0 1,7 0,28 
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 Comment by ATCO G: Multiple line-ups when no visual are nonsense. 
Comment by ATCO L: … if approved by our authority, it would be great. 
54 Take-off clearance 
I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be 
used to determine when to issue a take-off clearance. 
8.1.9 15 4,5 1,4 0,02*
55 Landing clearances 
When visual reference is not possible I think the A-
SMGCS surveillance display can be used to determine if 
the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance. 
8.1.10.2 15 5,3 0,6 0,00*
56 Conditional clearances 
Under good visibility conditions I think A-SMGCS 
surveillance data helps me to give conditional clearances in 
a safe and efficient way. 
8.1.11 15 4,0 1,6 0,23 
 Comment by ATCO O: Not only the A-SMGCS. 
57 When visual reference is not possible, I think A-SMGCS 
surveillance data helps me to give conditional clearances in 
a safe and efficient way. 
8.1.11 
8.1.11.2 
15 4,1 1,5 0,13 
 Comment by ATCO G: When no visual reference = no conditional clearances 
Comment by ATCO O: Not only the A-SMGCS. 
60 Visibility Transition 
With A-SMGCS, it would make sense to redefine the 
visibility limits for the transition to low visibility 
operations. (if yes, please indicate your suggestions) 
6. 12 2,3 0,9 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO C: The time between arrivals and departures would be shorter, we shouldn’t wait for “runway 
vacated” report, and the distance between two arrivals could be shorter. 
Comment by ATCO F: In a process to redefine visibility limits is A-SMGCS ok only one part. 
Comment by ATCO G: Visibility limits are for pilots. 
63 A-SMGCS level 2 procedures 
I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect lit stop bar 
crossings. 
8.2 14 4,9 0,7 0,00*
63a I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect runway 
incursions. 
     
70 A-SMGCS level I & II phraseology 
Existing phraseology can be maintained without change 
while using A-SMGCS. 
7. 
7.1.3 
14 4,7 0,6 0,00*
71 I have experienced situations where existing phraseology 
should have been changed while using A-SMGCS. 
7.1.3 
12.1. 
14 2,8 1,2 0,04*
 Comment by ATCO F: e.g. squawk assigned code – some pilots do not understand 
Table 4-7: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Procedure” operational feasibility 
items 
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4.2.2 Long Term Alerting Performance Assessment 
The objective of this test was to assess the operational feasibility of the alerting function. Technically 
the function’s performance has been verified (cf. 2.3.12, 2.3.13, and 2.3.14) but the controllers’ 
acceptance has not been assessed in the field. For this purpose the monitoring and alerting function 
was switched on at the active CWP for more than two weeks in January 2006. But, the service was not 
used fully operational16 but only used to be monitored by controllers in case of a conflict situation.  
 
To assess the operational performance the controllers were requested to report each conflict situation 
and to compare it with the alerts shown on the A-SMGCS display. They were requested to report the 
date and UTC and to assess whether the alert was right (wanted), false (due to a false target), 
unwanted, or missed. Information (stage 1) alerts was not assessed to reduce the additional workload 
of the controller. The reporting sheet was developed with support of an ANS_CR controller and 
translated to Czech language to get easier the controllers’ acceptance to perform this additional work. 
 
Following template has been given to the controller: 
 
Date UTC  Stage 2 alert (red)  false  unwanted  missed
   too early right too late       
            
            
            
            
 
Instructions: 
The objective of this sheet of paper is to assess the performance of the A-SMGCS alerting function and 
to adapt it to your needs. For this purpose, we need your operational feedback. Therefore, it is very 
important that you monitor all alerts on your A-SMGCS display the whole time you are working with 
it.  
 
There are two stages of alerts. The stage 1 alert (amber) intends to attract your attention on a traffic 
situation that is potentially dangerous, e.g. two aircraft on the runway, one is lining up while another 
one is just vacating. The stage two alert (red) would require an immediate reaction by you to solve a 
actual conflict situation. You are questioned to red alerts only. 
 
If you see such red stage 2 alerts on your A-SMGCS display you are kindly requested to give your 
personal assessment to it. If the alert is wanted by you, you should assess if the alert was too early, 
right in time, or too late to help you in the best way. 
 
If an alert is raised due to a false surveillance target, please make a cross with false. 
 
If an alert is raised although there is no conflict situation that would need your special attention, make 
a cross with unwanted. 
 
Last, if you are confronted with a real conflict situation but the system did not raise an alert or 
information, make a cross with missed. 
 
Do not forget to note the Date and UTC time. 
 
If you find time we would really appreciated if you write some explanations to the experienced conflict 
situation, e.g. CSA456 landed on RWY24 but missed exit C and was still at the runway when following 
                                                     
16 With visibility conditions lower than 3000m, the service had to be switched off. 
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landing CSA3267 was 30 seconds from threshold. This will help us additionally to tune the system 
alerts to your operational needs. 
 
Thank You for your collaboration. 
 
Concluding Results 
As it happened, the template could not been filled out by the controllers. This was caused by several 
reasons: First, the controller did not accept the additional workload or simply forgot to report an 
observed conflict situation. Secondly, the A-SMGCS display is not the primary display that is 
observed by the TEC but the E2000. Alerts that are displayed on the A-SMGCS display are not 
supported by an audible signal and thus could easily miss the controller’s attention. 
Concluding, no results were gained with this test. 
 
4.2.3 Flight Tests - Case Studies for Testing the Alert Performance of 
“Crossing Runway Alerts” 
These trials were performed on five days during the field trials (cf. the protocols with section 4.2.3). 
Each trial lasted approximately one hour with five to 12 conflict situations.  
Case studies mean that during the regular traffic (at times of very less traffic amount) test vehicle or 
test aircraft cause safety critical scenarios to issue system alerts. The controllers who actively 
controlled the traffic were presented with these alerts and were asked afterwards for their views on the 
operational feasibility. The detailed conflict scenarios can be seen in the annex 6.1. 
Four different runway crossing scenarios have been tested: 
• departure – departure, 
• departure – arrival, 
• departure – crossing, and 
• approach – approach conflicts 
 
The first three departure conflicts could be tested by using a test car and the regular approaching or 
departing traffic. For the tests of the approach – approach conflicts, test aircraft had to be used. There 
were two CAA aircraft, a BE 400 and an L 410.  
 
The following test protocols (4.2.3.1) give a complete report of these case studies, whereas section 
4.2.3.2 summarises the results. 
 
4.2.3.1 Raw Data – Flight Tests Protocols 
 
Date: 2006-01-17 
Test Run Number: 1 
Name: Tykal / Jakobi 
Active vs. Shadow Mode Shadow Mode 
 
General Comments / Conditions: 
• Test car and regular traffic were used 
• Alerts were observed at the test bed Tower platform on the EMMA A-SMGCS by a former 
ANS_CR controller 
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• With EMMA alert settings, only two conflicting aircraft issue a crossing runway alert 
(wanted) 
o Therefore, the EMMA vehicle had to be seen as an aircraft by the system to conduct 
the test with test vehicles. 
 
UTC Mov1 DEP APP Mov2 DEP APP Cross Stage 2 alert (red) 
       too early right too late missed
11:03 EMMA 31  CSA880 24     x   
Comments: 
• Targets turned to amber alert, when they commenced take-off (both were moving) and turned 
to red alert when the speed was higher than 20kts 
• Alert was resolved when CSA880 passed the RWY31 intersection (diverging targets) 
 
11:05 EMMA 31  GWI772P   Fox31     x 
Comments: 
• There was no alert issued 
• The reason for this failure was probably a surveillance failure because the EMMA vehicle had 
two targets suddenly whereas one was interpreted as airborne by the system 
 
11:14 EMMA 31  NAX1514   Fox31   x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine 
 
11:15 EMMA 31  AZA512   Fox31   x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine 
 
11:17 EMMA 31  CSA72C 24     x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine 
 
11:24 EMMA 31  AZA517 24     x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine 
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Date: 2006-01-18 
Test Run Number: 2 
Name: Tykal / Jakobi 
Active vs. Shadow Mode Active 
 
General Comments / Conditions: 
• EMMA A-SMGCS was running now on the real TPC CWP – other CWP run with the 
commercial A-SMGCS 
• EMMA vehicle had a permanent speed between 40 and 55 kts 
• EMMA vehicle was defined again as a departure aircraft within the system.  
 
UTC Mov1 DEP APP Mov2 DEP APP Cross Stage 2 alert (red) 
       too early right too late missed
11:09 EMMA 31  CSA2KL 24 B     x   
Comments: 
• When EMMA started and speed was higher than 20kts amber stage 1 alert arose for 2 second 
that was substituted by a stage 2 alert  
 
11:13 EMMA 31  AZA517 24     x   
Comments: 
• When EMMA started and speed was higher than 20kts amber stage 1 alert arose for 2 second 
that was substituted by a stage 2 alert 
 
11:17 EMMA 31  CSA72C 24     x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine 
 
11:21 EMMA 31  CSA28W 24 B     x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine 
 
11:27 EMMA 31  DLH94X  24       
Comments: 
• Invalid: problems with snow ploughs on RWY 22 that worked within the sensitivity area of 
RWY31 and caused a stage 2 alert with the “EMMA” vehicle 
 
11:32 EMMA 31  NJE983Q  24    x   
Comments: 
• EMMA started moving when NJE983Q was 75 sec away from threshold  
• Stage 1 alert – off –stage 1 alert – stage 2 alert when aircraft was less than 30 seconds away 
from threshold 
• Probably, flight test with real aircraft that have higher speeds and a constant deceleration and 
not a constant speed as the test car 
 
11:34 EMMA 31  AZA512  24    x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine, even when alert varied from stage 1 to off and to stage 2 again 
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11:43 EMMA 31  CSA961  24    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 until CSA 961 was less than 30sec away from threshold when it stage 1 switched to 
stage 2 
• When speed of the car was lower than 20kts alert was cancelled 
 
11:48 EMMA 31  EXS195   Fox31   x   
11:48 EMMA 31  CSA790 24     x   
Comments: 
• EMMA vehicle departure + Crossing + Departure 24 at the same time 
• Both alerts worked well – all 3 labels were red (stage 2 alert) 
 
11:52 EMMA 31  SAS1767  24    x   
Comments: 
• Worked fine, even when alert varied from stage 1 to stage 2 when SAS1767 was 45 sec away 
from threshold 
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Date: 2006-01-23 
Test Run Number: 3 
Name: Tykal / Jakobi 
Active vs. Shadow Mode Active 
 
General Comments / Conditions: 
• Flight tests with two CAA test aircraft CBA40 (BE40) and CBA41 (L410) concentrated on 
Approach – Approach conflicts exclusively, because this conflict could not be tested with test 
cars the week before 
• CPA has been reduced by ANS_CR from 900 to 700 meter but TCPA increased from 75 to 80 
seconds that stage alert arises appr. 45 seconds before threshold 
• Alerts worked fine, but probably still to early – TCPA will be switched back to 75 sec for the 
next day 
 
UTC Mov1 DEP APP Mov2 DEP APP Cross Stage 2 alert (red) 
       too early right too late missed
12:30 CBA40  24 CBA41  31   x    
Comments: 
• Stage one alert with 60sec from threshold, stage 2 with 45 sec 
• CBA41 did a left turn, CBA40 an overshoot  
 
12:43 CBA40  06 CBA41  31      x 
Comments: 
• Stage 1 alert with 60sec but disappeared with 45 sec 
• Speed probably too low to meet TCPA 
 
12:54 CBA40  24 CBA41  13      x 
Comments: 
• Neither stage 1 nor stage 2 alert 
• CBA41 passed the crossing area when CBA41 was more than 700 meters away from this 
crossing area 
 
13:05 CBA40  24 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 with 75 to 60 sec, stage 2 from 60, 45, and 30 sec 
 
13:12 OKLMR 31  PTACNIK   31   x   
Comments: 
• Not planned but crossing stage 2 alert worked fine 
 
13:16 CBA40  06 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• No stage 1 alert 
• Stage 2 alert after 60, 45, and 30 sec 
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13:29 CBA40  24 CBA41  13    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 and stage 2 alert started after 75 sec and changed several times from stage 1 to stage 2 
and back 
• CBA40 landed and CBA41 flew a go-around by a right turn. 
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Date: 2006-01-24 
Test Run Number: 4 
Observer: Tykal / Jakobi 
TPC –TEC: IS / ZH 
Active vs. Shadow Mode Active 
 
General Comments / Conditions: 
o Same test scenario as the day before 
o TCPA has been tuned again: 
o stage 1: 90 sec 
o Stage 2: 75 sec 
 
UTC Mov1 DEP APP Mov2 DEP APP Cross Stage 2 alert (red) 
       too early right too late missed
08:32 Squawk 
3311 
  OKWDC 31     x   
Comments: 
• Target – most probably a helicopter – turned around the north of RWY 24 
• Alert recordings detected an “opposite traffic on the runway” conflict 
 
12:17 CBA40  24 CBA41  31      x 
Comments: 
• Neither stage 1 nor stage 2 alert 
• System calculates no point of closest approach closer than 700 m within 90 sec or that CBA41 
achieves the crossing area within 120 sec (TTX = 120 sec) 
• Speed of CBA41 was very low (130kts) and too far away from threshold to initialize an alert 
with the current alert settings 
• But alert or at least information is wanted. 
 
12:29 CBA40  06 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 alert with 60 sec for CBA40 and 45 sec for CBA41 
• After 2 seconds stage 2 alert with 60 sec for CBA40 and 45 sec for CBA41 away from 
threshold. 
 
12:39 CBA40  24 CBA41  13    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 alert with 90 sec for CBA40 and 75 sec for CBA41 
• Disappeared for 2 seconds but reappeared immediately 
• Stage 2 alert with 60 sec for CBA40 and 45 sec for CBA41 away from threshold. 
 
12:48 CBA40  24 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 alert with 75 sec for CBA40 and 45 sec for CBA41 
• Disappeared for 2 seconds but reappeared as stage 2 alert with 60 sec for CBA40 and 45 sec 
for CBA41 away from threshold. 
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UTC Mov1 DEP APP Mov2 DEP APP Cross Stage 2 alert (red) 
       too early right too late missed
12:57 CBA40  06 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• 3315 helicopter has flown in the north of RWY24 and caused stage 2 alert with CBA41 when 
CBA41 was >90 seconds away from threshold 
• Stage 1 alert with 75 sec for CBA40 and 60 sec for CBA41 
• Switched back to stage2 alert with helicopter meanwhile CBA40 remained amber coloured 
(stage 1) 
• Stage 2 alert with 60 sec for CBA40 and 45 sec for CBA41 away from threshold. 
 
13:11 CBA40  24 CBA41  13    X   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 alert with 45 sec for CBA40 and 60 sec for CBA41 
• Stage 2 alert with 30 sec for CBA40 and 45 sec for CBA41 away from threshold. 
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Date: 2006-01-25 
Test Run Number: 5 
Observer: Tykal / Jakobi 
TPC –TEC: Non- EMMA controller 
Active vs. Shadow Mode Active 
 
General Comments / Conditions: 
• TCPA has seen tuned for stage 1 alert to get it earlier 
o Stage1 TCPA is now 100 sec (yesterday 90 sec) 
• DEP – APP Conflicts are tested with a test vehicle to investigate the new settings from 10:00 
to 11:00 
• from 12:00 to 13:00 APP-APP conflicts are tested with the two CAA test aircraft 
 
UTC Mov1 DEP APP Mov2 DEP APP Cross Stage 2 alert (red) 
       too early right too late missed
10:06 EMMA 31  CSA505   31   x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 followed by a stage 2 alert 
 
10:08 EMMA 31  CSA617  24    x   
Comments: 
• 24 EMMA stated when arriving was very close to the 24 threshold 
• Stage 2 alert arose immediately when aircraft was 30 sec away from threshold. 
 
10:13 EMMA 31  BAW 854  24    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 2 alert but when speed Sid already braked on RWY24 
• Vehicle went with constant 60kts which was too slow to meet CPA within TCPA. 
 
10:15 EMMA 31  BAW854   31   X   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 followed by a stage 2 alert. 
 
10:19 EMMA 31  CLW9019  24    x   
Comments: 
• EMMA vehicle now starts from RWY22 intersection 
• Stage 2 alert when CLW 45 seconds away. 
 
10:21 EMMA 31  LOT523  24    x   
Comments: 
 
10:23 EMMA 31  CSA961  24    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 alert with 45 sec away from threshold, followed by a stage 2 alert when CSA961 was 
less than 45 seconds away from threshold. 
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10:24 EMMA 31  LOT523   31   x   
10:27 EMMA 31  DAT67F  24    x   
Comments: 
 
 
10:31 EZY5494 24  CSA842 13    UNWANTED 
Comments: 
• Both aircraft started take-off at the same time but in different directions where they never 
would meet 
• Stage 1 and stage 2 alert were popping up, even when the EZY5494 has passed RWY 31/13 
• UNWANTED alert 
• Probably there is no CPA criteria but only speed (to be checked) 
 
10:43 EMMA 31  KLM1352 24B     x   
Comments: 
• EMMA started late (after KLM has commenced its take-off) 
• But worked well – with 20kts stage 1 alert, with 40kts car speed stage 2 alert popped up. 
 
10:45 EMMA 31  CSA916 24     x   
Comments: 
• Departure alerts seems to be working fine and reliable 
• 20kts – stage 1; 40kts – stage 2 
 
10:49 EMMA 31  CSA977  24    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1 with 45 sec and stage 2 below 45 sec 
 
 
12:01 CSA962 13  CSA050 24B    UNWANTED 
Comments: 
• Simultaneous take-off but with diverging directions 
• UNWANTED alert 
 
12:22 CBA40  24 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1: CBA40 75 – CBA41 75 sec 
• Stage 2: CBA40 45 – CBA41 45 sec 
• This timing is absolutely wanted 
 
12:24 EMMA 31  BMI88X   31   x   
Comments: 
• EMMA vehicle, which is still seen as an aircraft by the system, taxied on RWY31 and caused 
an alert (stage 2) with the crossing BMI88X. 
 
12:33 CBA40  06 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1: 90-60 sec 
• Stage 2: 75-30 sec 
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12:49 CBA40  24 CBA41  13     x  
Comments: 
• Stage 1: no stage 1 alert (CBA41  
• Stage 2: 30-45 sec 
• Stage 2 alert is probably a bit to late – TCPA should be increased from 75 sec to 80 seconds, 
eventually (to be discussed). 
 
13:00 CBA40  24 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1: 75-75 sec 
• Stage 2: 45-45 sec 
 
13:10 CBA40  06 CBA41  31    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1: no stage 1 alert but stage 2 was fine 
• Stage 2: 45-30 sec 
 
13:22 CBA40  24 CBA41  13    x   
Comments: 
• Stage 1: 60-90 sec 
• Stage 2: 45-45 sec 
• Perfect 
 
 
4.2.3.2 Results 
In total 50 conflict situation have been tested with very satisfying results (cf. Table 4-8). There were 
only 4% of unwanted alerts and 10% of missed alerts, which seems to be a bit too much to assess it as 
operationally acceptable but the results do not reflect the full operational alert performance because 
the tests were also used to tune new alert parameter settings. At the end of the trials, the best setting 
was found so that the assumption can be made that further tests would increase the percentage of right 
alerts compared to unwanted and missed alerts. 
 
Stage 2 alert (red) Conflict 
too early right too late missed unwanted  
DEP - DEP 0 10 0 0 2 12 
DEP - APP 0 11 0 0 0 11 
DEP - CROSS 0 7 0 3 0 10 
APP - APP 1 13 1 2 0 17 
1 41 1 5 2 50  
2% 82% 2% 10% 4% 100% 
Table 4-8: Alert Performance Results with Crossing Runway Conflicts 
 
The alert setting “evolution” can be seen with Table 4-9. However, these settings are only valid for 
Prague purposes and for a special system design. They will have to be developed and adapted when an 
alert function is being tuned for another airport. 
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 30.11.05 16.1.06 20.1.06 24.1.06 25.1.06
TTX sec 100 100 120 120 120 
Min. speed m/s 10 10 10 10 10 
TCPA Stage1 sec 90 90 95 90 100 
CPA Stage1 m 1200 950 700 700 700 
TCPA Stage2  sec 75 75 80 75 75 
CPA Stage2 m 1200 950 700 700 700 
Abbreviations: 
TTX = Time for arrival aircraft to crossing area 
TCPA = Time to Closest Point of Approach) 
CPA = Closest Point of Approach 
Table 4-9: Alert Parameter Setting for the Runway Crossing Alerts for different days of the Flight Tests 
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4.3 Operational Improvements (Field Trials) 
With the operational feasibility tests (4.2), full sets of performance/operational requirements and 
procedures have been tested for their operational feasibility. To fully validate a system it must also 
show that new services and procedures contribute to an operational improvement. There are four areas 
of interest to measure these operational improvements: 
• Safety 
• Capacity (in terms of throughput) 
• Efficiency 
• Human Factors aspects 
 
The following general hypotheses had been set up to describe the expectation with the controllers’ 
answers with respect to the “operational improvement”: 
 
Identifier Hypothesis 
OI-SAF3-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “safety” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
OI-SAF3-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “safety” aspects expressed by a specific 
safety item. 
 
OI-EFF6-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “efficiency/capacity” aspects 
expressed by a specific safety item. 
OI-EFF6-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “efficiency/capacity” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
 
OI-HF5-H0 The controllers’ opinion does not agree to the “Human Factors” aspects expressed 
by a specific safety item. 
OI-HF5-H1 The controllers’ opinion agrees to the “Human Factors” aspects expressed by a 
specific safety item. 
 
4.3.1 Debriefing Questionnaire (operational improvements) 
As already outlined with section 4.2.1, the a 144 items questionnaire and a t-test for the statistical 
analyses has been used: 
• One-Sample T-Test 
• Expected mean value = 3,5 
• Answers from 1 (disagreement) through 6 (agreement) 
• N = 15 
• α = 0.05 
• p-value is on single sided because of the use of directed hypothesis 
 
The items referring the “operational improvement” and their results are reported in the following 
sections 4.3.1.1 “Safety”, 4.3.1.2 “Efficiency/Capacity, and in section 4.3.1.3 “Human Factors”. 
A star (*) attached to the p-value means that a questionnaire item has been answered significantly 
because the p-value is equal or less than the critical error probability α, which is 0.05. Additionally, 
such items are coloured green. 
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When the controllers significantly express their acceptance to a single service or procedure item, it can 
be assumed that the operational feasibility is proven. 
Items written in italics could not be answered meaningfully because the controllers had limited or no 
operational experience with the topic (e.g. except in the case of lit stop bar crossing, no system alerts 
have been used operationally by the ATCOs). When controller comments were given to an item, they 
are reported directly below the statement.  
 
4.3.1.1 Safety 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item N Mean SD p 
28 When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to 
operate safer. 
15 5,4 0,5 0,00*
50 A-SMGCS is helpful for better monitoring aircraft commencing it’s 
take off roll. 
15 5,0 1,3 0,00*
61 I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect or prevent runway incursions. 13 4,9 1,0 0,00*
62 I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect or prevent incursions into 
restricted areas. 
13 5,0 0,8 0,00*
120 The use of A-SMGCS endangers safety at the airport. 10 2,1 1,2 0,00*
129 There is a risk of focusing too much on a single problem when using  
A-SMGCS. 
10 2,9 1,1 0,12 
Table 4-10: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Safety” operational improvement 
items 
 
 
4.3.1.2 Efficiency/Capacity 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item N Mean SD p 
9 When visual reference is not possible, I think identifying an aircraft or 
vehicle is more efficient when using the surveillance display. 
15 5,2 1,3 0,00*
10 I think, also in good visibility conditions, identifying an aircraft or 
vehicle is even more efficient when using the surveillance display. 
15 5,2 0,6 0,00*
11 Recognition of the aircraft type is more efficient with A-SMGCS. 15 5,0 1,1 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO F: depends on information in a label. When I have a type in a label then I agree. 
Comment by ATCO K: If real type is identified with flight plan one. 
29 When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to 
operate more efficiently. 
15 5,2 0,8 0,00*
38 When visual reference is not possible I think longitudinal spacing on 
taxiways can be reduced with A-SMGCS. 
15 4,7 1,3 0,00*
39 Without visual reference but using A-SMGCS, it would no longer be 
necessary to make records of vehicles on the manoeuvring area. 
15 3,8 1,2 0,35 
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41 Coordination between involved control positions is more efficient with 
A-SMGCS. 
10 4,5 1,1 0,00*
42 With A-SMGCS hand over processes between different control 
positions are more efficient. 
15 4,6 1,3 0,03*
 Comment by ATCO F: We have not hand over procedures so? 
Comment by ATCO H: hand over procedures not applicable 
43 The number of position reports will be reduced when using A-SMGCS 
(e.g. aircraft vacating runway-in-use). 
15 4,9 0,7 0,00*
45 In good visibility line-up at the runway threshold is easier to control 
with A-SMGCS.  
15 4,7 1,0 0,00*
46 When the runway threshold is not visible line-up is easier to control 
with A-SMGCS. 
15 5,3 0,5 0,00*
47 In good visibility line-up from intersection is easier to control with A-
SMGCS. 
14 4,7 1,3 0,00*
51 With A-SMGCS, a clearance for a rolled take-off can be issued more 
frequently. 
15 4,6 0,9 0,00*
52 In good visibility take-offs from intersection are easier to control with 
A-SMGCS.  
15 4,5 1,1 0,00*
53 When an intersection is not visible take-offs from the intersection are 
easier to control with A-SMGCS. 
15 5,1 0,6 0,00*
58 The transition from normal operations to low visibility operations is 
easier with A-SMGCS. 
15 4,9 0,9 0,00*
72 The control of aircraft with the A-SMGCS is very efficient. 15 5,1 0,8 0,00*
74 A-SMGCS reduces waiting times for aircraft at the airport. 15 3,9 1,5 0,35 
112 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to separate aircraft safely. 15 4,9 1,0 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: Not in the air 
113 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect runway incursions. 14 4,9 1,2 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: Not if warnings are not on. (not used in Prague) 
114 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect incursions into closed taxiways. 13 4,8 1,3 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: Not if warnings are not on. (not used in Prague) 
Comment by ATCO F: Not applicable 
115 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect incursions into protected areas. 15 4,8 1,3 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: Not if warnings are not on. (not used in Prague) 
116 With A-SMGCS, it is easier to detect aircraft on the apron. 15 4,5 1,1 0,00*
 Comment by ATCO E: Apron in common settings is suppressed. 
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121 I think that the A-SMGCS increases traffic throughput at the airport. 15 4,0 1,1 0,22 
121a When the traffic demand is higher than the current capacity I think with 
A-SMGCS the traffic throughput can be increase. 
5 3,4 1,5 0,89 
122 The A-SMGCS enables me to handle more traffic when visual 
reference is not possible.  
15 4,3 1,1 0,01*
124 The A-SMGCS enables me to execute my tasks more efficiently. 14 4,5 1,1 0,00*
128 There are less frequent unexpected calls of A/C and vehicles with A-
SMGCS. 
12 3,4 1,3 0,84 
137 The use of A-SMGCS facilitates information gathering and 
interpretation. 
15 4,6 0,7 0,00*
Table 4-11: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Efficiency/Capacity” operational 
improvement items 
 
4.3.1.3 Human Factors 
4.3.1.3.1 Situation Awareness 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item N Mean SD p 
12 The A-SMGCS display gives me a better position situational awareness 
(where is the traffic).  
15 5,4 0,5 0,00*
13 The A-SMGCS display gives me a better identification situational 
awareness (who is who). 
15 5,3 0,6 0,00*
125 The A-SMGCS helps me to maintain good situation awareness. 15 5,2 0,4 0,00*
126 “Maintaining the Picture” is supported well by the A-SMGCS. 15 4,9 0,5 0,00*
127 I feel that A-SMGCS enables me to predict better the evolution of the 
traffic (to be ahead of the traffic). 
15 4,4 1,0 0,00*
131 The A-SMGCS display helps to have a better understanding of the 
situation. 
15 5,2 0,4 0,00*
Table 4-12: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Situation Awareness” operational 
improvement items 
 
4.3.1.3.2 Workload 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item N Mean SD p 
14 I think identifying the traffic using A-SMGCS increases workload. 15 2,1 1,3 0,00*
59 When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to 
reduce my workload. 
15 5,2 0,6 0,00*
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73 The use of A-SMGCS makes the controller’s job more difficult. 15 1,7 0,5 0,00*
76 The use of A-SMGCS has a negative effect on job satisfaction. 15 1,5 0,5 0,00*
138 The use of A-SMGCS increases mental effort for checking information 
sources. 
14 2,4 0,9 0,00*
139 The use of A-SMGCS decreases workload for anticipating future traffic 
situations. 
15 4,7 0,6 0,00*
Table 4-13: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Workload” operational 
improvement items 
 
4.3.1.3.3 Human Error 
 
VA-
Id. Questionnaire Item N Mean SD p 
118 The introduction of the A-SMGCS decreases the potential of human 
error. 
14 2,7 1,4 0,05 
119 The introduction of the A-SMGCS is associated with new types of 
human error. 
13 3,1 1,1 0,20 
 Comment by ATCO M: Aircraft at holding point with mixed up labels can lead to calling wrong aircraft. 
Comment by ATCO O: see item 107 
136 The A-SMGCS is useful for reducing mental workload. 15 4,8 0,7 0,00*
Table 4-14: Debriefing Questionnaire - Means, SD, and P-Value for “Human Error” operational 
improvement items 
 
 
4.4 Daily Observations 
At each day of the operational field trials, protocols were created to gather all observations and 
comments given by the controllers and technicians. The following sections, which are sorted by the 
date, outline these results. 
 
3rd November 2005 
• At the old Tower there are 4 EMMA A-SMGCS CWPs now (incl. Gap Filler and updated 
HMI) 
• Information (yellow) when two movements are within the runway sensitivity area – is wanted 
and happens when arriving aircraft is still on the runway and another one is lining up behind 
• Time Arrival Windows is still “less than 30 seconds” and not “at least 30 seconds” – will be 
corrected with the new software update 
• ATCO C said: the system is very useful for him, and as the system was not useable due to 
maintenance, he said he recognised that he was used to work head down only 
• Labels sometimes overlap, but the controller can manually move them 
• GA on intersection take off Bravo without label (no transponder) 
• ATCO E and F said: In LVP they ask aircraft number 2 if it can see number 1. If yes, they 
allow two aircraft in one taxiway segment. If not, no clearance. But, with A-SMGCS this rule 
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could be softened. Probably, a safety net around the aircraft to warn the controller of 
movements that approach each other. 
 
16th of January 2006 
Weather conditions 
• Snow but  
• Runways and taxiways are cleared from snow 
• LVO in the morning but good visibility in the afternoon 
 
Alerts 
• All alerts (except of the runway crossing alerts) are switched on the regular CWP for one 
week now 
• Ciurrent procedures require that the alerts be switched off when the visibility drops below 
3000m 
• Long-term alert performance questionnaire that was distributed to the TEC CWP is not 
regarded by the controllers  
o No audible alert and TEC use E2000 as primary display 
o Red alerts are very rare and if they are unwanted they are not recognised by the TEC 
o TEC does not take the time the note the alert performance 
• Audible alert has not been installed because it is very distracting due to its high volume and 
permanent signal (peep). As yet, the controllers have not specified what is required. 
 
EMMA System 
• The EMMA system was unreliable during the this day due to a hardware fault which was 
corrected. 
 
Flight Tests 
• No flight test today, because the EMMA system is needed to test the runway crossing alerts 
that are not part of the commercial A-SMGCS 
• The day after planned DEP-DEP; DEP-APP; and DEP-CROSSING conflict shall be tested 
with vehicles and normal traffic to save costs and time. 
 
DMAN 
• DMAN was not running in the morning but has been rebooted from Braunschweig remotely 
• Flight plans were there and planning and real traffic matched together (passive mode). 
 
 
17th of January 2006 
Weather conditions 
• Snow but  
• runways and taxiways are cleared from snow 
• Good visibility the whole day 
 
Alerts 
• Audible alerts have been tested to install them on the Tower, but were estimated as too loud 
and too permanent until the conflict is solved – this is not acceptable to the controller because 
it could distract the communication of other CWP 
• However one single „peep“ would be acceptable and even wanted by the controllers, however 
this could not be implemented during the field trials. 
 
EMMA System 
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• EMMA System is running again and will additionally be installed at the TEC CWP for the 
time of the flight tests (this is needed because the commercial A-SMGCS does not include 
runway crossing alerts) 
 
Flight Tests 
• Crossing runway alerts case studies were performed from 1200 to 1230 with an EMMA 
vehicle and normal traffic (cf. Test Observer sheet 4.2.3) 
• DEP-DEP and DEP-CROSSING have been tested  
• DEP-APP could not be tested because no regular arrival was expected in the near future but 
will be done the day after. 
 
DMAN 
• DMAN was running but not continuously 
• DEP RWY13 is not indicated with DMAN because the DMAN is only outlined for the more 
usual runway configuration with the beginning - columns are occupied by RWY24 and 
RWY31 
 
 
18th of January 2006 
Weather conditions 
• 8000m visibility 
• RWY24 and RWY31 in use 
 
 
EMMA System 
• Runs perfectly 
• Alitalia did not switch on the transponder, which seems to be quite normal the ATCOs said 
• Controllers said “Time to threshold” window shall be updated to “time and more” instead of 
the current “time and less” 
• Alert and Visibility settings shall be permanently displayed 
 
Flight Tests - Case Studies Crossing runway alerts 
• DEP31 – DEP24, DEP31 – APP24, DEP31 – Crossing RWY31 via Foxtrot have been tested 
(see observer sheet and pictures) 
• DEP31 were simulated by a test vehicle “EMMA” 
• APP24 and Crossing were performed by normal traffic 
• EMMA A-SMGCS was switched on at the TPC CWP – other CWP were commercial A-
SMGCS 
• 5 DEP-DEP; 5 DEP-APP, and one crossing were tested within 45 min 
• Nearly all alerts worked fine 
 
DMAN 
• Running continuously 
 
 
23rd of January 2006 
Weather conditions 
• 8000m visibility 
• RWY06 and RWY31/13 in use 
• Wind calm 
• -16°C 
• Snow 
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EMMA System 
• False Targets 
o There was snow and operations were interrupted by snow-clearing  
o Snow and ice has to be cleared from the movement area otherwise it will cause 
unwanted radar targets 
• Missing departure flight plans 
o A controller reported that he has the feeling that when aircraft go off-block very early 
or very late compared to its EOBT the flight plan is missing in the departure list on 
the A-SMGCS surveillance display, (the reason for this needs further investigation) 
? Actual OBT very far away from EOBT happen very often in winter time 
when de-icing procedures have to be used 
 
Flight Tests - Case Studies Crossing runway alerts 
• Flight tests with two CAA test aircraft CBA40 (BE40) and CBA41 (L410) concentrated on 
Approach – Approach conflicts exclusively, because this conflict could not be tested with test 
cars the week before 
• The alert parameters have been changed by ANS_CR so that stage1 alert arises appr. 45 
seconds before threshold 
• Alerts worked fine but probably still to early – alert parameters were tuned again for the next 
day 
 
DMAN 
• No activity (no flight plans are indicated) because DMAN is only tuned for RWY 24 and 
RWY31 
 
 
24th of January 2006 
Weather conditions 
• 8000m visibility, no clouds 
• RWY24 and RWY31/13 in use 
• Wind calm 
• -10°C 
• Snow 
 
EMMA System 
• Worked fine again 
• MT (ANS_CR) proposed to switch off primary targets when LVP is in force: 
o This would solve the problems with false targets and false alerts due to snow and 
heavy rain  
o During LVP, all movements (aircraft and vehicles) must be equipped with Mode-S 
o Snow Ploughs in convoy where mostly only one vehicle is equipped are not used 
during LVP or the runway will be closed 
o AG (PAS) said that this is technically possible to arrange but he warned of non-
equipped targets that cannot then be seen anymore 
o JJ (DLR) asked if the controller could be given the possibility to delete false targets 
on the display (when s/he has verified 100% that the target is false) 
o No decision on this  
 
Flight Tests - Case Studies “Crossing runway conflicts” 
• With new alert algorithm settings, the information and alerts popped up later 
• The decision on which settings are better could not be taken but must be discussed later 
• Generally, all alerts worked fine today 
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• After the case studies ANS_CR decided that they want to get the information earlier  
 
DMAN 
• Worked fine 
 
 
25th of January 2006 
Weather conditions 
• 7000m visibility 
• RWY24 and RWY31/13 in use 
• Wind calm 
• -10°C 
• Snow 
 
EMMA System 
• Worked fine again 
• When LVP, then: 
o Stop bars are switched on 
o Intersections or stop bars are used as visual reference points for pilots to hold when 
needed 
o The controller has never experienced that pilots have not been able to see each other 
o The controller estimates: to follow an aircraft by looking out of the cockpit should be 
possible down to 100m visibility but those sight conditions are very unlikely 
 
Flight Tests - Case Studies “Crossing runway conflicts” 
• Unwanted DEP-DEP alerts 
o DEP13 – DEP24 alerts have been observed, which are absolutely unwanted because 
aircraft are diverging and would never meet with those speed vectors 
• Results of the day were fine but probably stage 2 alert was a bit late sometimes, but this has to 
be discussed with other operational people 
• Single Arrival alerts 
o They are currently set with 30 sec for stage 1 and 15 sec for stage 2 
o But, these settings are probably too low because T2 = 15 sec is sometimes below the 
decision height 
o A better setting could be stage 1 alert (T1) = 40 sec and stage 2 alert (T2) = 20 sec 
DMAN 
• Worked fine 
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5 Conclusions 
5.1 Prague V&V Approach  
The A-SMGCS V&V activities with Prague Ruzyne Airport were done on two validation platforms:  
• Real Time Simulation (RTS) and 
• On-site at the Prague Ruzyne Airport. 
Three levels of V&V activities have been performed on both platforms: 
• Technical Tests (Verification), 
• Operational Feasibility (Validation), and 
• Operational Improvements (Validation). 
Different objectives were aimed for with the different test platforms and levels of testing. The 
technical tests checked whether the installed A-SMGCS in the simulation or in the Tower environment 
fulfilled all technical requirements to enable the operational use of the system and to perform the 
validation activities. The technical systems answered the question: “Did we set up the system right?”. 
 
RTS and On-site trials focussed on validation activities but with two different levels of testing. Real 
Time simulations usually offer a good opportunity to measure operational improvements in terms of 
objective traffic data (e.g. taxi times, R/T load, etc.). They were also used to investigate safety critical 
situations like low visibility conditions or conflict situations without any danger.  
On-site trials were mainly needed to test the system in the real environment in terms of its technical 
performance and of its operational feasibility. The controllers who worked with the A-SMGCS fully 
operational (within all visibility conditions) were asked if they accept the A-SMGCS design, 
performance, and the new operational procedures. All platforms and levels of testing were needed to 
fully validate the A-SMGCS. 
 
5.2 Prague V&V Results 
The A-SMGCS, which was installed at Prague Ruzyne Airport, has been validated. All technical and 
operational results affirm the overall main question: “Did we build the right system?”. 
All main technical and operational requirements could be verified (cf. 2.4 and [11]). For this purpose, 
technical short- and long-term measurements have been conducted. With some requirements the 
system performance could not fully meet the standards (e.g. “Op_Perf-01-Probability of Detection” 
should be 99,9% but only 99,65% was measured) but the controllers’ acceptance of this slightly lower 
performance showed that even a lower PID could be valid to work with it safely and efficiently.  
For the long-term system performance measurements, the MOGADOR tool was used. MOGADOR is 
a tool, developed in EMMA, that analyses fully automatically specific performance parameters from a 
long-term recorded data pool of the regular airport traffic. This tool revealed interesting results that 
can also be used to tune and adapt the A-SMGCS to meet the operational needs. However, the Prague 
long-term results, analysed with MOGADOR, still lack maturity because the time was not sufficient to 
fully adapt the MOGADOR algorithm to the specific Prague airport characteristics, which is always 
needed to measure the real system performance automatically. 
The operational on-site trials (field tests) revealed that the controllers, who have worked with the A-
SMGCS fully operationally for 7 months now, accepted the A-SMGCS and thus approved its 
“operational feasibility”. Statements like: 
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• “When visual reference is not possible, the displayed position of the aircraft on the taxiways is 
accurate enough to exercise control in a safe and efficient way.”, or 
• “I think that the A-SMGCS surveillance display could be used to determine that an aircraft has 
vacated the runway.”, or 
• “The information displayed in the A-SMGCS is helpful for avoiding conflicts.”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS provides the right information at the right time.”, or 
• “When visual reference is not possible I think the A-SMGCS surveillance display can be used 
to determine if the runway is cleared to issue a landing clearance.” 
 
have been significantly confirmed by 15 ANS_CR controllers. The statements mainly refer to the 
surveillance service of the A-SMGCS, because the ANS_CR controllers have not used the full scope 
of the monitoring and alerting function yet but only the “stop bar crossing” alerts as a first step. 
However, flight tests, which were used to evoke additional conflict situations at crossing runways, 
showed that also the performance of other monitoring alerts was accepted by the controllers. 
 
To fully validate a system it must also show its operational improvements. This was mainly done in 
real time simulations because RTSs can provide real experimental conditions. The most important 
result of the RTS was that A-SMGCS is able to reduce the average taxi time. In both simulation 
phases, the average taxi time was reduced by 13,6% and 7,1% respectively. Both results are highly 
significant with 968 total movements.  
 
Furthermore, A-SMGCS reduces the load of the R/T communication. With RTS1 a reduction of 
16,0% and with RTS2 a reduction of 11,1% was measured, whereas only the RTS1 results showed 
statistical significance.  
 
A further operational improvement can be assumed with the “controller’s reaction time in case of a 
conflict situation”: 5,3 seconds instead of 6,0 seconds without A-SMGCS showed an interesting 
trend but became not significant. However, with a bigger sample size it can be assumed that this small 
effect could also become significant. 
 
These objective operational improvements, which were measured on the real-time simulation test 
platform, could also be confirmed with controllers’ subjective statements in the field. Controllers were 
asked to estimate their perceived safety and efficiency when they work with A-SMGCS compared to 
earlier times when they did not use an A-SMGCS. The following main results were gained: 
 
• “When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to operate safer.”, or 
• “I think A-SMGCS can help me to detect or prevent runway incursions.”, or 
• “When visual reference is not possible, I think identifying an aircraft or vehicle is more 
efficient when using the surveillance display.”, or 
• “I think, also in good visibility conditions, identifying an aircraft or vehicle is even more 
efficient when using the surveillance display.”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS enables me to execute my tasks more efficiently.”, or 
• “The number of position reports will be reduced when using A-SMGCS (e.g. aircraft vacating 
runway-in-use).”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS enables me to handle more traffic when visual reference is not possible.”, or 
• “The A-SMGCS display gives me a better situational awareness.”, or 
• “When procedures for LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps me to reduce my workload.” 
 
These examples, which were all positively answered by the controllers, further support the hypothesis 
that A-SMGCS provides significant operational improvements that will result in operational benefits 
for all stakeholders of an A-SMGCS.  
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6 Annex 
6.1 Flight Tests Scenarios 
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6.3 Abbreviations 
 
Acronym Meaning 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast 
AGL Aerodrome Ground Lighting 
ANS CR Air Navigation Services of the Czech Republic 
ARP Aerodrome Reference Point 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
ASR Airport Surveillance Radar 
ASTERIX All-Purpose Structured Eurocontrol Surveillance Information Exchange 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
AUX Auxiliary Mass Storage Unit 
BITE Built-In Test Equipment 
BRM Bearing and Range Marker 
CDD Clearance Delivery Dispatch 
COTS Commercial-Off-The-Shelf 
CWP Controller Working Position 
df Degrees of freedom 
DSNA Direction des Services de la Navigation Aérienne 
EC European Commission 
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 
ESUP Eurocat Support system 
EU European Union 
EUROCAE European Organisation for Civil Aviation Equipment 
EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation 
F F value in the F statistics 
FAT Factory Acceptance Test 
FDPS Flight Data Processing System 
FHA Functional Hazard Analysis 
GEC Ground Executive Controller 
GFS Gap Filler System 
GSR Ground System Requirements 
HMI Human-Machine Interaction 
HW Hardware 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ID Identifier 
IP Internet Protocol 
KVM Keyboard/Video/Mouse 
LAN Local Area Network 
LAT Latitude 
LCD Liquid Crystal Display 
LON Longitude 
LVP Low Visibility Procedures 
M Mean 
MET Meteorological 
MLAT Multi-Lateration 
MVP Machine Vision Processor 
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Acronym Meaning 
NTP Network Time Protocol 
p p-value (error probability that the measured mean belongs to the H0 hypothesis) 
PAS Park Air Systems AS 
PDAS Probability of Detecting an Alert Situation 
PFD Probability of False Detection 
PRG Prague 
PTL Predicted Track Line 
PU Processing Unit 
RANC Radar Analyser and Compressor 
RCMS Remote Control and Monitoring System 
RDPS Radar Data Processing System 
RPA Reported Position Accuracy 
RPS Recording and Playback System 
RS Recommended Standard 
RVA Reported Velocity Accuracy 
RWY Runway 
SAT Site Acceptance Test 
SD Standard Deviation 
SDF Sensor Data Fusion 
SDS Surveillance Data Server 
SID Standard Instrument Departure 
SMR Surface Movement Radar 
SP Sub-Project 
SQB Squitter Beacon 
SSA System Safety Assessment 
STAR Standard Terminal Arrival Route 
SW Software 
TCP Transport Control Protocol 
TEC Tower Executive Controller 
TECAMS Technical Control and Monitoring System 
TPC Tower Planning Controller 
TRUR Target Report Update Rate 
TWY Taxiway 
V&V Verification and Validation 
VSDF Video Sensor Data Fusion 
WGS World Geodetic System 
WP Work-Package 
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